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INTRODUCTION
Within the past few decades, unprecedented changes in the available means
of human reproduction have made it possible to separate reproduction from
sexuality, to distribute the tasks of biological maternity among different
women, and to manipulate the spatial and temporal dimensions of reproduction.
These possibilities challenge traditional assumptions about the facts of every
stage of human reproduction: sexual intercourse, conception, gestation and
birth. In addition, the new reproductive technologies confront traditional
understandings of the family with novel familial constellations, which are not
necessarily grounded in biological processes as firmly as old-fashioned family
groups.
The dramatic development of new reproductive technologies within the past
few decades' coincides with extraordinary changes in the shape of the
American family. As in vitro fertilization, 2 cryopreserved embryos,3 and
gestational surrogacy4 have become realities, divorce, single-parent families
and working mothers have become commonplace.'
Questions about the meaning of "mother", "father", and "child",
occasioned by reproductive technology, arise in a world already unsure of the
meaning and contours of family. Traditional assumptions about the character,
longevity, and membership of the family, as well as assumptions about the
connection between the family as a social unit and the biological facts long
thought to produce and undergird that unit, are in disarray. Yet families
continue to be understood in traditional terms6-as domains of love that
1. Louise Brown, the first child conceived outside a woman's body using in vitro fertilization, was
born in England in 1978. Carol Lawson, Celebrated Birth Aside, Teen-Ager is Typical Now, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 4, 1993, at A18 (describing 15 year old Louise Brown as normal teen-ager belonging to "ordinary
family").
2. Originally known as "extracorporeal mammalian fertilization," in vitro fertilization (IVF) allows
the fertilization of eggs in a culture dish. The technique was first used successfully with rabbits in 1958.
Howard W. Jones, Jr. & James P. Toner, Current Concepts: The Infertile Couple, 329 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1710, 1714 (1993).
3. Cryopreservation of human embryos is the freezing and storing of early embryos in cryoprotectants,
chemical agents that protect the embryo from potentially harmful consequences of the freezing and thawing
process. Cryopreserved embryos can be thawed and implanted in a woman's uterus for gestation and birth.
BRUCE R. CARR & RICHARD E. BLACKWELL, TEXTBOOK OF REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE 582-83 (1993).
4. The development of in vitro fertilization has made gestational surrogacy possible. A gestational
surrogate gestates and gives birth to a child conceived outside her body using another woman's eggs. The
gestational surrogate does not, therefore, have a genetic link to the child she bears.
5. Elaine Tyler May, Myths and Realities of the American Family in 5 A HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE:
RIDDLES OF IDENTITY IN MODERN TIMES 583 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds. & Arthur
Goldhammer trans., 1991) (describing 1960 as a "demographic watershed" in character of American
family); Census Paints A New Picture of Family Life, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1994, at A17 (reporting 24%
of American children live in one-parent families according to 1991 report).
6. Traditionally, American society perceived the family as a universe of love and "enduring diffuse
solidarity." DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT 48-50 (1968). This
conception of family has existed in the West since the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution almost 200
years ago. See NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER 4 (1978) ("With the development of capitalism and the industrialization that
followed, production outside the home expanded greatly, while production within the home
declined .... Home and workplace, once the same, are now separate.") (footnote omitted).
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contrast with the world of work and money. And the law continues rather
consistently to invoke a traditional, old-fashioned conception of the family in
regulating the creation and operation of family relationships.
The relevance of biological facts to the resolution of family disputes varies
from case to case. Sometimes the facts of reproduction are expressly at issue,
as in paternity suits. Sometimes, as with adoption orders, the facts of
reproduction are disregarded or self-consciously superseded. The law in the
United States has long acknowledged parent-child relationships not founded
on biological connections, such as those formed through adoption or through
artificial insemination using donor sperm. The law has also provided for the
termination of biological parents' legal parenthood in cases of child abuse or
neglect.
Rarely, however, have family law courts been confronted with an entirely
new set of reproductive facts.7 Reproductive technologies, however, have
produced such novel reproductive scenarios as multiple biological mothers,8
or embryos stored indefinitely in test tubes. Such cases require that the courts
determine not only who is the mother, the father, or the baby, but what is a
"mother," a "father," or a "baby." The simultaneous challenge to the social
facts of family and to the biological facts of family preclude certainty of almost
any sort. Thus, cases occasioned by reproductive technologies fundamentally
challenge traditional assumptions about the social implications of human
reproduction.9 This Article examines the response of the law to litigants'
invocations of biological facts in cases occasioned by reproductive technology.
Part I describes the ideological transformation of the family from an enduring
social unit defined by reference to inexorable, natural facts to a collection of
individuals governed by the rules of the marketplace. Part II analyzes the
treatment of the biological facts of human reproduction in family law disputes,
and suggests that through such disputes society is re-defining the scope and
parameters of the family. Finally, Parts III and IV present and analyze three
illustrative cases. In each case, courts and litigants invoked, disputed,
disregarded and reformulated the biological facts of human reproduction. Like
many cases occasioned by reproductive technology, each of the three cases
reflects a basic tension underlying many current family law decisions. This
7. The exception has been artificial insemination, especially in cases in which the sperm of a donor
rather than of the woman's husband was used. In such cases brought before the 1960s, courts were not
always willing to recognize the woman's husband as the child's legitimate father, even if his consent to
the insemination had been obtained. In Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup.
Ct. 1963), a New York court noted that other courts had found artificial insemination using a donor's sperm
to "constitute . . . adultery." The court accordingly found that the child "is not the legitimate issue of
the husband." Id. at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 411.
This problem rarely arises outside the context of divorce since artificial insemination can be, and
generally was, kept secret. See infra note 14 (presenting brief history of artificial insemination).
8. Reproductive technology has separated biological maternity into several aspects. Previously, a
woman who gave birth to a child was assumed to be the child's biological mother. Now, a woman who
gives birth may share biological maternity with an ovum donor and even with another gestator.
9. See infra notes 18-26 and accompanying text.
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tension arises between a view of family that preserves traditional assumptions
about kinship connections and a view of family that recognizes families as
collections of autonomous individuals who, like actors in the marketplace,
choose to join together at various times and for various purposes. Despite
widespread changes in family law in recent decades, courts adjudicating family
disputes continue to justify their decisions in reference to traditional family
values and traditional models of reproduction. This pattern is especially stark
in the context of cases occasioned by reproductive technology. The result is
irony and confusion about the law's response to the changing structure and
definition of family.
I. THE FAMILY AND THE IDEOLOGY"0 OF FAMILY:
TRADITION AND TRANSFORMATION
At least since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the family in the
United States has been understood as a special, almost sacred, arena of social
life grounded in inexorable natural relationships. Within the last few decades,
that view of the family has begun to erode. The body of statutory rules and
judicial decisions regulating the creation, operation and dissolution of families
has come increasingly to resemble the law that governs interactions in the
marketplace. "
Traditionally, kinship claims have been understood to be anchored firmly
?h nature. Within the traditional family, rights and duties are largely established
through reference to the "nature of things" and, to that extent, are not open
to negotiation. So, for example, parents are expected to care for their children.
This obligation defines and constitutes the parental role. Similarly, traditional
differences between fathering and mothering have been assumed to follow
inevitably from differences between males and females. Anthropologist Nancy
Chodorow notes that social scientists studying kinship and families have failed
to ask why women "mother" and men do not. The reason, suggests Chodorow,
10. The term "ideology," as used here, does not mean a system of false beliefs. Rather "ideology"
refers to the deep-seated system of beliefs, usually unarticulated, through which people make sense of their
own lives and of the world in which they live. This definition follows that of the anthropologist and
Indologist Louis Dumont. Dumont wrote:
Our definition of ideology thus rests on a distinction that is not a distinction of matter
but one of point of view. We do not take as ideological what is left out when
everything true, rational, or scientific has been preempted. We take everything that
is socially thought, believed, acted upon, on the assumption that it is a living whole,
the interrelatedness and interdependence of whose parts would be blocked out by the
a priori introduction of our current dichotomies.
Louis DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX: THE GENESIS AND TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC IDEOLOGY
22 (1977).
11. Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82 GEO.
L.J. 1519, 1559-64 (1994) (describing changes in family law during past several decades).
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is largely that "[wiomen's mothering ... is seen as a natural fact," and for
social scientists, as for others, "natural facts . . . do not need explanation."12
In contrast to family relationships, which are grounded in biological truths
or in patterns of behavior that reflect those associated with "blood"
relationships, relationships at work are understood as endlessly negotiable.
Relationships at work endure, and are expected to endure, only as long as they
are necessary to accomplish specific goals. " That is to say that at work,
rights and obligations result from the terms of the employment, not from the
inherent nature of the personal relationships. At home, relationships are
considered paramount and are defined through reference to lasting truths; at
work, the autonomous individual, linked to other individuals through choice,
is free to define the terms of everyday life through ceaseless negotiation.
Within the past three decades, the fundamental assumptions underlying
understandings of family have become subject to debate. To some extent, a
new vision of the family has emerged. To reflect that new vision, family law
has changed to accommodate new understandings of marriage, divorce, and
to a lesser extent, a new understanding of the parent-child relationship.
Ideologically, the transformation has involved acknowledgment that families
and familial relationships are not natural or inevitable but constructed and
contingent. The development of reproductive technology disrupts our
understanding of biological facts, thus rendering disputes involving family
relationships increasingly uncertain. While virtually no one dismisses biological
facts entirely in defining the parameters of family, it is no longer clear
precisely how those facts affect the organization of familial life. Instead, the
social implications of biological reproduction have been reinterpreted and
reshaped by society and by the law.
The family, once understood as an essential unit comprised of members
linked by relationships, is now increasingly understood as a collection of
autonomous individuals whose relationships to one another can be re-designed
and re-imagined as often as the parties choose. If certain forms of biological
connection are no longer essential to the creation of family, then the options
for defining families are almost endless.
II. THE DEBATE ABOUT THE BIOLOGICAL
FACTS OF HUMAN REPRODUCTION
Only recently has it become possible for humans to orchestrate the
processes of human reproduction.14 Previously, whatever people might have
12. CHODOROW, supra note 6, at 14.
13. Obviously, relationships formed "at work" may endure beyond the work itself. In that case,
however, the relationships have been transformed into other kinds of relationships, such as friendships.
14. The so-called new reproductive technologies are sometimes described to include artificial
insemination. In fact, this procedure is quite old and provides a remarkable, although until recently rarely
used, exception to the claim that the technological manipulation of human reproduction is only decades
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imagined "the miracle of birth" to imply, they agreed with remarkable
consistency about the facts of reproduction. For more than a hundred years,
Western society, reflecting the views of Western science, understood human
reproduction as a continuous process beginning with sexual intercourse between
a man and a woman, including the fertilization of an egg (provided by the
woman's body) by sperm (provided by the man's body), the subsequent
development of the embryo within the woman's body, and then the birth of
a baby from the body of the woman in whom conception occurred.
Reproduction still occurs that way; but it occurs in numerous other ways
as well. As a result of the new reproductive technologies, conception need not
involve sexual intercourse and need not begin in a woman's body. After
conception, the resulting embryo may be divided into two or four or more
identical embryos; it may be tested for genetic disease and discarded if
defective; it may be frozen and stored for months, or even years, and then
thawed for implantation and gestation. The woman who provides the egg need
not be the woman who gestates the resulting embryo. Two different women
can give birth to "identical twins" or one woman may give birth to "twins"
years apart. Moreover, women well into menopause may gestate and give birth
to babies; 5 babies may be born years after the deaths of their genetic
"parents,"16 and soon eggs for the production of human children may be
retrieved from aborted fetuses. 7
Reproductive technology multiplies the ways through which human
reproduction can occur. However, reproductive technology has not widely
challenged the scientific understanding of the biological facts of human
reproduction with a competing understanding of those facts. It does not entail
a dramatically novel theory of reproduction,'" but represents an elaboration
and development of an existing scientific paradigm. Reproductive technology
uses that paradigm and even serves to demonstrate its accuracy and power by
multiplying the possibilities for manipulating the processes of reproduction.
The changes made possible by reproductive technology do not challenge
the theories which explain how reproduction occurs. Rather, they challenge
old. Assisted insemination (as some prefer to term the practice) was probably used for humans as early
as the late eighteenth century. WINFRED FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 5-6 (2d ed. 1976). Many
sources claim that the procedure was used by Arabs to inseminate mares as early as the fourteenth century;
that claim may be apocryphal. CARMEL SHALEv, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY 59 (1989).
15. A 59-year old British woman gave birth to twins in 1993. Other similar cases have been reported
as well. Eugene Robinson, Furor Over Fertility Options: Should Eggs From Fetuses or Cadavers Be Used
to Help Women Become Pregnant?, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 1994, at Z6.
16. Judy Licht, Frozen in ime; Storing of Embryos Boosts the Chances of Pregnancy and Raises
Ethical Questions, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at ZIO.
17. Robinson, supra note 15.
18. Such a theory would offer a completely different understanding of human reproduction; it might
suggest, for example, that an embryo is not, in fact, formed from an egg and a sperm; or that the genetic
composition of a fetus comes largely from one gamete donor but not from the other. The possibilities are
endless. Such theories, if taken seriously, would constitute what historian of science Thomas Kuhn has
called a paradigm shift-actually, a new view of the way things in fact are. THOMAS KUHN, THE
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970).
[Vol. 7: 37
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the fundamental assumption that human reproduction is the result of natural
processes which inevitably define social relationships. The challenge is not to
one scientific theory, however familiar and however significant to the social
order, but to the very notion that the science of human reproduction reflects
a natural, unyielding process. If babies can be manufactured in laboratories,
a possibility that has not (yet) been realized, then the biological correlates of
human reproduction can no longer be used to ground securely the system of
values and beliefs that Americans have traditionally attached to family. As a
result, disputes occasioned by the new reproductive technologies provide
remarkably fruitful contexts for furthering the more fundamental debate-the
debate about the form and future of the family itself.
For instance, family disputes resulting from surrogate motherhood or
cryopreserved embryos occur in a context in which both the social and
biological aspects of family are questioned. Consequently, traditional
understandings of the social order can be invoked to justify or to mask the
significance of transformations in the processes of reproduction. At the same
time, those seeking to condemn reproductive technologies can contrast those
traditional understandings with the apparent implications of reproductive
technology to demonstrate the untoward, even immoral, consequences of the
latter. 9 Moreover, the biological facts can be invoked and analyzed to justify
a decision about the scope and design of the social order or to condemn
changes that seem to defy the dictates of natural truth.
Some supporters, for example, justify traditional surrogate motherhood20
by pointing out that it helps infertile couples have children. Similarly, the
parties to a dispute involving a baby produced from a gestational surrogacy
arrangement may attempt to invoke biological facts in order to identify the one
natural mother; or they may question the relevance of biological facts
entirely.2" Whatever the strategy, such cases make it impossible for litigants
and courts to continue to assume that the biological facts of human
reproduction ground the family and familial relationships in unyielding, natural
truth.
In short, disputes occasioned by reproductive technology provide a
particularly rich context for debating the definition and fate of the family.
Almost all the traditional anchors-the biological and social correlates of
family-are simultaneously dislocated. Ultimately, the terms through which
such disputes are aired and resolved can broadly affect society's understanding
19. An extraordinarily insightful analysis of some of these possibilities appears in Marilyn Strathern,
New Familiesfor Old?, in THE FAMILY IN THE AGE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (C. Ulanowsky, ed., forthcoming)
(on file with author).
20. "Traditional surrogate motherhood" refers to surrogacy arrangements that involve a surrogate
whose gametes are used in conception and who gestates and gives birth to the resulting fetus. In contrast,
gestational surrogacy involves a separation of the genetic and gestational aspects of motherhood between
two women.
21. See infra notes 28-91 and accompanying text (analyzing understandings of biological facts in case
of gestational surrogacy).
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of family and of personhood. Therefore, discourse about reproductive
technology promises far-reaching implications for the connections between the
biological facts of reproduction and the meaning of family.
The new reproductive technologies may be taken to signal the end of order
or, alternatively, the achievement of unprecedented possibilities of choice and
happiness. For some, the new reproductive technologies violate the natural
order, and thus augur social chaos.' For others, they simply afford more joy
by providing more ways of producing good, old-fashioned families. One
British journalist, arguing that reproductive technology does not alter the
character of families, proclaimed: "This is what science is for, the extension
of human happiness through choice.'
In the face of the myriad confusions and uncertainties posed by
reproductive technology, disputing parties rely with remarkable consistency
on biological facts to present their arguments in court. Since the facts
themselves are rarely in dispute, opposing litigants rely on essentially the same
biological facts.24 Those facts are then presented to the court, by the disputing
litigants taken as a group, as conclusive evidence of contradictory social truths.
Consequently, the biological facts dim in significance. For example, if the
biological facts can demonstrate equally that a genetic mother and a gestational
mother are "real" mothers, then a dispute between competing mothers must
be resolved without appeal to biology.' In the end, defining the family as
a social reality through resort to the biological facts of family becomes
increasingly difficult. That consequence is of tremendous significance to a
society that has assumed for hundreds of years that kinship follows from
biogenetic relationships.26
III. WHAT IS A BIOLOGICAL MOTHER?
In vitro fertilization has made it possible to fragment biological maternity.
Gestational surrogacy, for instance, whereby one woman agrees to gestate and
give birth to a child, conceived through the gametes of another woman and a
man, 27  separates maternity into aspects. That separation, suggesting
22. See, e.g., ROBIN Fox, REPRODUCTION AND SUCCESSION 121-125 (1993) (arguing as a matter of
"science" that "the genetrix does indeed bond with the child in the womb .. . and hence has a 'natural'
claim to it" and concluding that "if we try to force bonded mothers to give up their children in the name
of contract ... we will fail-or at least deserve to fail"). Id. at 122, 123-24.
23. Simon Jenkins, A Plot Against the Family?, THE TIMEs, July 6, 1994.
24. The moral and existential implications of the facts of human reproduction, but not the facts per
se, are subject to dispute in such cases.
25. See infra Part III (analyzing competing claims to motherhood in gestational surrogacy cases).
26. SCHNEIDER, supra note 6, at 23. "[Klinship is whatever the biogenetic relationship is." Id.
27. Gestational surrogacy arrangements can involve a variety of permutations. If entered into by a
surrogate and a married couple, the ova of the wife may be fertilized with the sperm of the husband to
produce a zygote for implantation in the gestational surrogate. Alternatively, the egg or the sperm may
be donated by a second man or a third woman. This would most likely occur in cases in which the intending
parents are unable to produce ova or sperm or in cases in which one or both of them fear passing a
genetically deleterious gene on to the offspring. Gestational surrogacy arrangements can also, of course,
[Vol. 7: 37
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possibilities such as two mothers or, alternatively, no "real" mother,
challenges long-standing assumptions about the nature of maternity. Ovum
donation, an arrangement indistinguishable from gestational surrogacy from
a biological and technological perspective, involves a different social context.
In ovum donation, the gestational, rather than the genetic, mother intends to
be the social mother of the resulting child.
Many of the interpretive conundrums to which gestational surrogacy can
give rise emerged in the context of two recent cases. The first case involved
a custody battle between a married couple and a gestational surrogate. In the
second case, a New York couple engaged in divorce proceedings battled for
custody of twin daughters who had been gestated by the wife, but were the
genetic offspring of the husband and an ova donor.
A. Johnson v. Calvert
In Johnson v. Calvert all three parties predicated their parenthood on
a biological connection to one baby. Crispina and Mark Calvert, married for
several years, wanted to have a baby. Although a hysterectomy had made it
impossible for Crispina to gestate a fetus, the surgery had not interfered with
her body's production of ova. Anna Johnson, a co-worker in the hospital in
which Crispina was employed as a nurse,29 volunteered to serve as a
gestational surrogate for the Calverts. The couple and Johnson agreed that
Anna would gestate and bear a baby produced from Crispina's ovum and
fertilized in vitro by Mark's sperm. Johnson agreed that at the baby's birth she
would relinquish "all parental rights" to Mark and Crispina.30 In return, the
Calverts agreed to pay Johnson $10,000 in a series of installments and to pay
for a $200,000 life insurance policy on Johnson's life.3"
In January, 1990, an embryo produced from the Calverts' gametes was
implanted in Johnson's uterus. Johnson's pregnancy was soon confirmed. In
July, during the seventh month of her pregnancy, Johnson sought a $5,000
payment from the Calverts ahead of schedule, threatening to keep the baby if
the payment was not forthcoming. In response, the Calverts sued, seeking a
declaration of their parental rights.32
be entered into by unmarried couples or by unmarried single people who use their own gametes or donated
ova and sperm.
28. No. X-633190, slip op. (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990), aff"d sub. nom. Anna J. v.
Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991), affid sub non Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 206 (1993).
29. Anna Johnson, unmarried and the mother of a young daughter, was a vocational nurse in the same
hospital in which Crispina Calvert worked as a registered nurse. Karen H. Rothenberg, Gestational
Surrogacy and the Health Care Provider: Put Par of the 'IVF Genie Back into the Bottle, 18 LAW, MED.
& HEALTH CARE 345, 345 (1990).
30. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 372-73.
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1. The Decisions
All three California courts that heard the case held for the Calverts, though
on remarkably. different grounds. The trial court, characterizing Johnson as
a "gestational carrier," but a "genetic hereditary stranger" to the child,33
identified the "family unit" by reference to the "shared genes" among the
baby, Crispina, and Mark. Judge Parslow for the court said: "In this case we
have a family unit, all genetically related. You have Mark Calvert, Crispina
Calvert and their child they call Christopher, three people in a family unit."34
The appellate court affirmed, relying on state statutes that regulated the
law's recognition of the parent-child relationship.35 Thus, the appellate court
recognized Crispina Calvert as the baby's natural mother because blood tests
identified genetic similarities between her and the baby but not between the
baby and Johnson. However, unlike the trial court, the appellate court
explicitly acknowledged the existence of other rational schemes for identifying
a baby's mother in such cases.3 6
The California Supreme Court also affirmed the decision to declare
Crispina and Mark Calvert Christopher's mother and father, but on grounds
that differed from those of either the trial court or the appellate court.37 The
court found that the state's statutory scheme offered virtually no help in
identifying the real mother in this case.38 The statutory provisions on which
the appellate court relied had been promulgated in 1975, about a decade before
most legislators had even contemplated a need to regulate gestational surrogacy
arrangements. Thus, the state supreme court recognized that both Anna and
Crispina "adduced evidence of a mother and child relationship as contemplated
by the Act. " 39 Concluding that neither biology nor law provided adequate
criteria for selecting between Crispina and Anna, the court skirted both areas
in its analysis.
Moreover, the court refused to accept the plea of amicus curiae that both
women be denominated "mother." Under California law, the court proclaimed,
there is "only one natural mother, despite advances in reproductive technology
rendering a different outcome biologically possible."' For this conclusion,
33. Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at 5. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions
About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 684-89 (1993) (discussing implications of trial court and
appellate court decisions in Johnson).
34. Johnson, No. X-633190, slip op. at 10.
35. Anna J., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
36. See Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV.
637, 688 & n.215 (describing statutory scheme on which appellate court in Anna J. relied).
37. See Janet L. Dolgin, The "lntent' ofReproduction: Reproductive Technology and the Parent-Child
Bond, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1261 (1994) (analyzing California Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v.
Calvert).
38. As Ruth Macklin has said, defining the "real" mother in such cases must be understood as
prescriptive rather than descriptive. Ruth Macklin, Artificial Means of Reproduction and Our
Understanding of the Family, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 5, 6.




the court offered only enough explanation to suggest that, if needed, the
traditional conception of family would be invoked to justify legal
determinations about the form of family.4"
In identifying the baby's mother, however, the court rejected both statutory
regulation and biological truth in favor of "the parties' intentions as manifest
in the surrogacy agreement."42 In the court's view, the parties' competing
biological and statutory claims proved indeterminate. The court therefore
concluded:
[A]lthough the Act recognizes both genetic consanguinity and
giving birth as means of establishing a mother and child
relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one
woman, she who intended to procreate the child-that is, she
who intended to bring about the birth of a child that she
intended to raise as her own-is the natural mother under
California law.43
In relying on intent to establish parentage, the court bypassed the state's
statutory scheme as well as most of the arguments presented by the parties in
their briefs to the court. Both the briefs of Anna Johnson and those of Crispina
and Mark Calvert focused on and elaborated Anna's and Crispina's respective
biological claims to maternity. Almost all of the many briefs written in this
case were punctuated by each side's insistence that the biological facts
conclusively demonstrated that side's parentage. Each woman claiming to be
the baby's mother stressed the biological roots of her own claim to maternity.
And, in turn, each party discussed and then dismissed as inconclusive the
biological claims presented by the other.
2. Invocations of Biological Truth
In premising her parenthood on biological truth, Anna Johnson argued that
nature inevitably affects a bond between a woman and a baby that she gestates
and bears, and that the preservation and development of that bond establishes
the mother-child connection. She further argued that the link between a woman
and the baby she gestates is more significant from a biological perspective
"than [that] of the genetic donors."" The Calverts also stressed their
41. In a footnote, the court acknowledged the existence of families with more than two parents, created
as a result of divorce, but distinguished those families from that at issue in the present case. In finding the
family in the case to consist of Mark and Crispina Calvert and their new-born son, the court referred to
the Calverts' genetic connections to the child as well as to their parental intent. "The Calverts," the court
wrote, "are the genetic and intending parents of their son and have provided him, by all accounts, with
a stable, intact, and nurturing home." Id. at 781 n.8.
42. Id. at 782.
43. Id.
44. Petitioner's Opening Brief at 8, Johnson v. Calvert, 5 Cal. 4th 84, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (No.
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biological link to the child as conclusive of their parentage and of Anna's
essentially incidental role in the creation of their child. They argued that the
embryo, produced from their gametes and fertilized in vitro, was "already
defined [as] a new human individual"45 before it was implanted in Johnson's
uterus. Thus, in the Calverts' presentation, Johnson could not premise her
maternity on biology since, as a biological matter, the embryo-and thus the
complete being that was their child-existed before uterine implantation.'
The briefs as a whole demonstrate the remarkable flexibility with which
the society and the law can invoke and interpret biological definitions of
reproduction. Once assumed to represent the essence of natural parentage,
genes can be defined variously and may, among other things, represent an
almost incidental donation to the woman who maintains a "blood relationship"
with a baby she has gestated and to which she has given birth.47 Similarly,
gestation, understood for so long as the symbol and essential instance of
biological maternity-as the inviolable biological fact that distinguished
maternity from paternity48 and that made biological maternity synonymous
with social and legal maternity-can now be reinterpreted as creative of a
social rather than biological connection between a woman and the baby she
gestates and bears.49
Moreover, the briefs in Johnson challenge-and affirm-a wide array of
meanings that society presently attaches to the terms that define human
reproduction-terms such as fertilization, embryo, fetus, blood relationship,
and gene. Despite growing indications, as the case moved through the
California courts, that biological truths would prove conclusive for neither
side, each side continued vehemently to argue that its biological connection
to the child should be determinative.
a. The Symbols of Reproduction
Each prospective mother argued that her connection to the child was more
substantial than the connection of the "other mother" in the sense that her
connection was more real. Crispina Calvert and Anna Johnson each tried to
distinguish the real, enduring relationship (her own) from the more ephemeral
one. Each defined her relationship to the child in terms of an inexorable
S023721) [hereinafter Johnson Opening Brief to Supreme Court of California].
45. Respondents' Brief at 23, Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Ct. App. 1991) [hereinafter
Calvert Brief to Court of Appeal].
46. Id.
47. Appellant's Reply Brief at 8, Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (No.
S023721) [hereinafter Johnson Reply Brief to Court of Appeal].
48. See Dolgin, supra note 36, at 651-63 (analyzing Supreme Court distinctions between biological
maternity and biological paternity in cases concerning legal rights of unmarried biological fathers).
49. Judge Parslow, for the trial court in Johnson, described Anna Johnson's role as "analogous to
that of a foster parent providing care, protection and nurture during the period of time that the natural
mother, Crispina Calvert, was unable to care for the child." Johnson v. Calvert, No. X-633190, slip op.
at 5 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 22, 1990).
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biological connection. The women argued that their own biological connection
was more significant, either qualitatively (e.g., more natural) or quantitatively
(e.g., involving a greater investment of pain, time, or energy). Yet, for both
sides, the shadow of the other's biological connection to baby Christopher,
however fleeting, made it impossible to rely upon traditional assumptions about
the substantial connection that links mothers to their children.
The power of the claim that biological mothers could once make in
asserting their maternity depended on the exclusivity of that claim. In cases
occasioned by reproductive technology, assertions of biological maternity no
longer determine social maternity. Once the traditional assumptions about
maternity-and blood relations generally-are challenged by novel reproductive
possibilities, the entire scheme within which those relations once made sense
collapses.
In the wake of that collapse, the old terms continue to seem
important-even momentarily conclusive. In fact, the frame within which their
conclusiveness was once assured has eroded. Consequently, the parties in
Johnson, and in other similar cases,5" continue to argue back and forth, each
asserting her special claims to maternity in light of traditional understandings
of motherhood. But as the arguments proceed, each side's claims are confused
with, and ultimately become substitutable for, those of the other. Thus, the
claims of both sides flounder. Moreover, the respect once accorded biological
truth as an arbiter in defining familial relationships necessarily diminishes.
In Johnson, the differences between, and comparative significance of,
genetic and gestational contributions to the production of a child defined the
terms of the debate. In other cases, the terms of the debate are differently
defined. In cases occasioned by reproductive technology, the debate about the
significance and implications of particular biological facts becomes a debate
about something even larger. Ironically, Johnson and other cases like it
question the fundamental relevance of biological facts to the definition of
family relationships. Consequently, such cases almost inevitably enter the
contemporary debate about the changing meaning and implications of family
in American society. A more specific analysis of the controversies regarding
biological facts in Johnson, as they arose between the parties, and as they
affected the three courts that rendered opinions, reflects the wider debate.
b. The Symbols of Maternity in Johnson v. Calvert
Several sorts of contentions, more or less expressly articulated by the
parties, constituted the principle themes presented to the courts in Johnson.
Among these were conflicting contentions about the meanings of mother and
50. See, e.g., McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding mother
who did not provide eggs for in vitro fertilization was nevertheless "parent" or "natural mother" of
resulting twins); see infra notes 92-119 and accompanying text (analyzing McDonald).
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parent, the particular meaning of the term "blood mother," and conflicting
contentions about the role that choice can or should play for society and the
law in determining parentage. The parties considered each of these contentions
through reference to the comparative significance of genetic and gestational
contributions to the creation and development of a baby.
Significantly, none of the parties in Johnson argued that familial, including
maternal, relationships should be determined without reference to biological
connection. In fact, either side could have argued that culture, not nature,
should determine parentage. Johnson, for instance, might have emphasized that
based on her social and psychological bonds with the baby, forged in fact
during the long months of gestation, she, and she alone, had already
psychologically become a parent-the only parent figure in the young child's
life. The Calverts, in turn, might have presented (as the supreme court did)
the surrogacy contract and the parties' pre-conception plans as conclusive of
the child's parentage. 5
Instead, each side premised its claim to parenthood on the unique
significance of its biological connection to the baby. The Calverts argued that
a person is the consequence of his or her parents' combined gametic material,
and that, accordingly, at the fertilization stage of development, the identity of
a new human individual has already been defined. 2 The Calverts defined
Anna Johnson's role as essentially indistinguishable from that of the laboratory
where the egg was fertilized and developed before implantation in Johnson's
uterus. They declared:
From the moment that sperm successfully penetrates the ovum
and impregnation is achieved a new generation of human exists.
It is within the care and custody of medical experts that in the
laboratory provide the environment in which the embryo grows
and matures until it is ready for implantation into the uterus.
These laboratories and experts sustained the embryo during a
time when it could not survive in utero, at a time when Anna
Johnson could not provide the environment and care needed.
Likewise, Crispina Calvert could not provide the uterus with
which to care for the embryo, Anna Johnson could. She was
entrusted with the embryo's care until it developed and matured
and Crispina and Mark Calvert were able to provide the proper
environment and care.
It cannot rationally be said that there is a distinction
between paying for the care of the ovum by the doctors and
51. Although the Calverts obviously argued for the legality and enforceability of the surrogacy contract
entered into between themselves and Anna Johnson, even that argument was embedded in the discussion
of the parties' comparative biological claims. See Calvert Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 45, at 22-26.
52. Id. at 23.
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clinic and paying for the care of the ovum by the gestational
mother.5 3
Thus, the Calverts suggested that while Anna Johnson's role may have been
biological, it was not the role of a biological mother.
Johnson, in response, took issue with the Calverts' (and the trial court's)
understanding of biological reproduction. "There is no foundation in science,"
she declared in presenting her case to the appellate court, "to contribute to the
conclusiong [sic] that an actual birth mother is not a natural Biological
parent."" Johnson defined her psychological relationship to the child as a
natural consequence of her having gestated and given birth to the baby. She
further argued that because her biological maternity (unlike that of Crispina
Calvert) entailed a relationship to the baby, her gestational role, unlike the
Calverts' genetic role, reliably predicted that she would not just be a mother
but that she would be a good mother-a better mother-to the baby.
In presenting her case to the appellate court, Johnson quoted extensively
in her brief from the testimony of Dr. Michelle Harrison, a psychiatrist who
had served as an expert for Johnson at trial.55 "The baby in Anna Johnson's
womb," Dr. Harrison asserted, "is not the same baby that would have been
in the womb of Mrs. Calvert. Therein lies the total misconception."6 That
misconception, Dr. Harrison explained, was that "a baby is made from
DNA."" Harrison agreed without qualification when asked at trial whether
it could be said that "the biological contribution of the birth mother to the
creation of the baby is greater than the biological contribution of the
commissioning parents who donate egg and sperm. "58
Harrison further characterized Johnson's gestational bond to the baby as
the bond of "love." 59 She continued:
In my interview with Ms. Johnson, she talked tearfully about
the experience of nursing the baby . . . of her belief that he
recognizes her by odor,6" and when she has him he roots to
53. Id. at 26.
54. Appellant's Opening Brief at 27, Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991)
[hereinafter Johnson Opening Brief to Court of Appeal].
55. Dr. Harrison interviewed Johnson about her relationship to the baby and her desire to be that
baby's mother.
56. Johnson Opening Brief to Supreme Court of California, supra note 44, at 8.
57. Id.
58. Johnson Opening Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 54; at 5-xii (quoting transcript of testimony
offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 579).
59. Id. at 5-ii (quoting from transcript of testimony offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 483).
60. When Harrison was later asked to explain the assertion that the baby recognized Johnson "by
odor," she responded:
There are actually some scientific studies demonstrating newborn's [sic] familiarity
with the odor of the mother whey [sic] they have been nursed. And Anna in this case
.. . described how it felt to her when he began to root. In other words, when she
would pick him up after many days of not seeing him and he would begin to root for
her breast.
1995]
Yale Journal of Law and Feminism
nurse since she has continued to nurse even during the
visitations. She believes that he feels safe and falls asleep easily
in her arms .... 61
Finally, Johnson's lawyer asked Harrison what "make[s] a woman a
mother."62 She answered:
What makes her a mother is her emotional and physical work
in the nurturing of the fetus, and the way in which . . . her
body builds the baby. Her body brings it oxygen, her body
takes away waste, her body protects it both ... from bacteria
[and] from external assault.63
Harrison's testimony answered the Calvert's claim to genetic exclusivity and
allowed Johnson to argue that her biological connection to the baby, unlike that
of the Calverts, encompassed, and thus guaranteed, the fact and the success
of her psychological and social maternity. Johnson proclaimed that she was
the baby's social mother because she was the gestational mother. In short, she
argued that her social relationship to the child was an inevitable result of a
natural process and, therefore, superior to any relationship the Calverts might
effect with the child.
(1) What is a "Blood" Mother?
In this broad debate over the relationship between biological facts and
natural motherhood,' the parties engaged in several subsidiary controversies.
For instance, Anna Johnson and Crispina Calvert each presented herself to the
court as the baby's blood mother. Traditionally, the term "blood mother" has
been synonymous with "real mother"; for centuries blood has been understood,
at least metaphorically, as the essential substantial connection between a mother
and her child. In the post-Mendelian era, at least until recently,65 the terms
Id. at 5-v (quoting transcript of testimony offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 491).
61. Id. at 5-iv (quoting transcript of testimony offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 491) (footnote added).
62. Id. at 5-vi (quoting transcript of testimony offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 496).
63. Id. Harrison further declared:
ITihe mother's body in a sense relabels the embryo as being the same, because normally the body
rejects foreign tissue. And so when a woman becomes pregnant there is an immunologic process
that goes on by which the embryo gets labeled as being the same as her own tissue so that she
doesn't reject it. So that her body takes this in as her, her body treats this as though it were the
same tissue as the tissue of her hands or her heart or anything else. And as that process goes
on, she also incorporates the baby into her psychological development. She becomes two people,
both herself and the baby within her.
Id. (quoting transcript of testimony offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 497).
64. That Crispina Calvert was married to the baby's genetic father was of great significance to the
way in which the case was presented and decided. See Dolgin, supra note 44, at 687 (considering
importance of social facts to interpretation of biological facts in Johnson).
65. The advent of gestational surrogacy makes it possible to argue that a child's genetic mother and
blood mother are two different people. The genetic mother, according to this argument, is the ovum donor;
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"blood mother" and "genetic mother" have generally been understood to be
synonymous. It has been assumed that the real relationship between a woman
and her child results not from a literal contribution of maternal blood to a
fetus, but from a woman's genetic contribution to the embryo.
In a curious twist, the advent of gestational surrogacy, along with other
technological possibilities such as DNA blood-testing, once again encourages
people to understand blood literally, as a substance shared between a woman
and baby and as an indicator of fetal-maternal identity. Thus, each woman was
able to present herself as the baby's blood mother. Presumably, in
characterizing herself as the blood mother, each woman intended to draw on
the power traditionally associated with the metaphoric attribution "blood
mother." Each woman used scientific and legal discourse to show that her
maternity could conclusively and uniquely be premised on similarities between
her blood and that of the child.
The Calverts invoked several provisions of California law that together
allowed a child's genetic mother to be declared the child's legal mother.66
Focusing on the blood testing which can be used to establish genetic
relationships,67 they hypothesized:
Assuming this, or for that matter, any child were confused with
a number of other children in the hospital nursery. Assuming
further that no other identifying data is available. Could then
Anna Johnson prove her maternity? Indeed, only Crispina
Calvert could, by blood tests, prove her maternal connection
to the child.68
The Calverts also urged that the law recognize the continued importance of
preserving "human blood lines." The "social value" of human blood lines,
they declared, "is incalculable, for it is through our progeny that we perpetuate
culture, traditions and history."69
The Calverts specifically denied that there was a blood relationship
between Johnson and the baby.7" Presumably, the Calverts intended the term
"blood relationship" to serve as a synonym for "genetic relationship." Anna
the blood mother is the woman who gestates the fetus, sharing her blood with that of the fetus during the
period of fetal development.
66. The provisions in question were found in the Uniform Parentage Act, enacted in California in 1975
as Part 7 of Division 4 of the California Civil Code §§ 7000-7021 (West 1983) (cited in Anna J. v. Mark
C., 286 Cal. Rptr. at 373-74) and in the state's Evidence Code § 621. The statute was repealed in 1992.
67. Calvert Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 45, at 41.
68. Id. at 41.
69. Id. at 49.
70. Id. at 51. In response to Johnson's claim that her partial Indian heritage made the Indian Child
Welfare Act applicable to the case, the Calverts asserted that the baby "has no blood relationship to Anna
Johnson." Id. That Act requires notification to the relevant tribe should an Indian child be made available
for adoption. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903-1919. For the Calverts' argument against the relevance of the Indian
Child Welfare Act to this case, see Calvert Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 45, at 49-52.
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Johnson, in turn, presented herself as the child's blood mother. In doing so,
she relied on her gestational connection to the baby, referring to the "mixing
of blood between mother and baby" that occurs through the placenta and at
birth.7 Dr. David Chamberlain, who testified for Johnson at trial, described
Johnson and the baby as "intimately attached and biochemically related."72 In
the language of medical science, he described that attachment concretely:
There is a flooding of catecholamines. The mother's blood
stream carries adrenal hormones through the placenta to the
baby's blood. "Virtually everything that the mother has going
on in her body and blood stream goes directly through to the
baby." This is absolutely mainstream medical thinking.73
Finally, in characterizing herself as the baby's blood mother, Johnson
asserted that she too could claim parenthood on the basis of blood tests. In
response to the hypothetical the Calverts had presented 74 to demonstrate their
exclusive parentage, Anna Johnson maintained:
Respondents [the Calverts] claim that it would be impossible
for Anna Johnson to prove her maternity if the hospital nursery
had mixed up the babies in the hospital. Not only was this issue
never litigated or proved at trial, but the premise, once again
is a total falsehood.
Dr. Klaus, Dr. Call, Dr. Chamberlain and Dr. Harrison all
agreed that the baby was born with Anna Johnson's antibodies
and hormones.75 Testing the antibodies and hormones could
therefore prove maternity and clearly identify the baby.76
Thus, both the Calverts and Anna Johnson used expert testimony presenting
the biological facts of maternity to persuade the courts that Crispina or Anna,
respectively, should be exclusively identified as Christopher's blood
mother-and therefore as his real mother.
In the end, the parties' claims about the identity of the baby's blood mother
prove inconclusive, as do their claims about the comparative significance of
Anna's gestational, and Crispina's genetic, contribution to the baby's
development. Indeed, the parties' contentions almost neutralize each other, so
71. Johnson Reply Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 47, at 8.
72. Id. at 6-7 (citing transcript R.T. Vol. III p. 621).
73. Id. at 7 (quoting Dr. Chamberlain's trial testimony) (citations to transcripts omitted).
74. Supra text accompanying note 68.
75. Drs. Klaus, Chamberlain, and Harrison testified at trial as experts for Anna Johnson; Dr. Call
testified as an expert for Crispina and Mark Calvert.
76. Johnson Reply Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 47, at 8 (citations to transcripts omitted).
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that the identification of a single "real" mother on the basis of the biological
facts and arguments presented becomes largely a matter of social choice.
The obvious challenge such controversies pose to the biological facts
themselves-and, more importantly, to the relevance of biological facts
altogether in defining the family and characterizing familial
relationships-encourages new interpretations of human reproduction and its
social implications. Two further examples from the Johnson case illustrate this
point:
(2) When Is a Mother a Father?
Anna Johnson responded to the Calvert's presentation of the biological facts
by reinterpreting the social implications of those facts so as to define the
Calverts, or at least Crispina Calvert, as biologically-and thus presumably
also socially-abnormal. Anna acknowledged the importance of Crispina's
genetic contribution, but re-defined that contribution to be something other than
that of a mother.
In doing this, Johnson relied on a line of Supreme Court decisions
concerning the paternal rights of unwed fathers. 7 In those cases, the Court
distinguished paternity from maternity, asserting that the relationship between
a mother and her child is developed and cemented during the gestational period
and gives rise automatically to a parent-child relationship, while the connection
between a father and his child must be actualized in an ongoing social
relationship in order to merit legal recognition.78 For "natural fathers,"
proclaimed Justice Stevens, "the biological connection . . . offers . . . an
opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his
offspring."' In order to enjoy legal recognition of his paternal role, the Court
continued, the father must "grasp" the opportunity provided by his biological
link to the child.8" Extrapolating the Court's distinction between biological
maternity and biological paternity, Johnson asserted that Crispina resembled
a biological father more than a biological mother.8
Dr. Harrison, testifying as an expert for Johnson at trial, declared:
[I]t's really I think more like Anna is the mother and the
Calverts are the other half, the other interest. Like as I say,
77. Johnson Opening Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 54, at 36, 43-46. Johnson cited Michael
H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed,
441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978), and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972).
78. See Dolgin, supra note 36, at 647-72 (analyzing implications of Supreme Court decisions in unwed
father cases).
79. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Johnson Opening Brief to Court of Appeal, supra note 54, at 5-xi (quoting transcript of testimony
offered at trial, R.T. Vol. III p. 565).
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again, much more like a father, and again, that's not-I mean,
our language is gender related so it has implications which I
don't mean in this sense, but they are the genetic part of the
child.8 2
Accordingly, Johnson argued: "Both appellees stood in the shoes of an
expectant father, as each provided genetic material which impregnated
Appellant. "83
The argument illustrates the remarkable flexibility with which the symbols
of human reproduction can be interpreted. By elaborating the implications of
a rather traditional association between gestation and maternity and between
a seminal (genetic) donation and paternity, Johnson defined a genetic mother
as more like a father than a mother. Johnson in effect suggested that she be
recognized as the baby's mother-the parent for whom biology both
encompasses and assures an ongoing social connection with the child-and that
the Calverts, together, be recognized as the baby's "father." Under this
reading, Crispina is either defined as incidental (since the child clearly has a
father already) or as perverse, with the lurking suggestion that a woman so
distorted should not be recognized as the mother of a child who has a normal
mother already at hand.
(3) The Possibility of Two Biological Mothers
The American Civil Liberties Union's suggestion that the law find not two
fathers but two mothers, provides yet another example of the far-reaching
reinterpretation of human reproduction that gestational surrogacy arrangements
can suggest. The ACLU, writing as an amicus curiae, declared that Anna and
Crispina should each be recognized as mother." The courts, anxious to
preserve a more traditional view of family, rejected the notion.85
Certainly, the courts could have identified three biological parents,
including two biological mothers. Had they been determined to define the
biological, rather than the contractual or social, parents as the baby's legal
parents, then a conclusion that both Anna and Crispina were biological mothers
would have been quite plausible-even perhaps inevitable. While none of the
courts accepted this conclusion, each court's reasoning allowed for such a
possibility. Judge Parslow for the trial court declined "to split this child
emotionally between two mothers." He explained: "I've got a mother and
father genetically related to the child on one side of this equation. I believe
he should be raised exclusively by the Calverts as natural parents."86 Thus
82. Id.
83. Id. at 46.
84. Johnson v. Calvert, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 494, 499 n.8.
85. Id.
86. Johnson, No. X 63 31 90, slip op. at 14.
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Judge Parslow appears to have recognized the possibility of finding two
mothers, but not two natural mothers.8 7 Expressly relying on statutes, rather
than on an interpretation of biological facts, the appellate court found Crispina
to be the only natural mother. However, the decision leaves open the
possibility that under a different statutory scheme, or under a different
interpretation of the existing statute, Anna, might be defined as the child's
natural mother. This implies, in theory at least, that both women could be
named as mothers.
The state supreme court directly addressed the possibility of two biological
mothers, 8 declaring that both women "have adduced evidence of a mother
and child relationship as contemplated by [California law]. Yet for any child
California law recognizes only one natural mother, despite advances in
reproductive technology rendering a different outcome biologically
possible."89 The court only hinted at the reasoning behind this declaration.
Recognizing the growing incidence of "multiple parent arrangements" in the
context of divorce, the court concluded that
[N]o compelling reason [exists] to recognize such a situation here.
The Calverts are the genetic and intending parents of their son and
have provided him, by all accounts, with a stable, intact, and
nurturing home. To recognize parental rights in a third party with
whom the Calvert family has had little contact since shortly after
the child's birth would diminish Crispina's role as mother.90
The court's recognition of Crispina Calvert's exclusive maternity rested on
some combination of biological, social, and contractual factors and cannot be
read to imply that, in the eyes of the supreme court, Anna Johnson presented
no viable claim to biological maternity.
Even the Calverts, who had argued consistently for their exclusive
biological parentage, responded to the ACLU's recommendation by asserting
87. Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
88. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 781.
89. 851 P.2d at 781. The court's assertion is reminiscent of one made several years earlier by the
United States Supreme Court in a case that tested the constitutionality of a California statute providing that
"the issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively presumed
to be a child of the marriage." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 115 (1989) (Scalia, J.) (plurality
opinion) (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)). The statute, which was repealed in 1992,
actually stated that "the issue of a wife cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively
presumed to be legitimate." CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 (West 1966 & Supp. 1994). Under the statute,
biological fathers were given no opportunity to rebut the marital presumption. See CAL. EVID. CODE §
620 (West 1994) (establishing "conclusive presumptions"). In Michael H., Michael sought paternity of his
biological child, whose mother was married to Gerald. Under the statute, the court could not recognize
Michael's paternity. 491 U.S. at 113-15. In his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia declared that "California
law, like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood." Id. at 118. By the time Johnson was heard,
it had become far less certain that nature was in accord with the law on this point. See Dolgin, supra note
36, at 668-70 (analyzing Justice Scalia's uses of the term "natural" in Michael H.).
90. 851 P.2d at 781 n.8.
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that a judicial finding of two mothers (or three parents) would ill serve the
child's best interests."1 That contention averts, but does not gainsay, Anna
Johnson's claim to biological maternity.
In fact, the unanimity with which the courts rejected the possibility of a
three-parent family is at least partly explained by the threat such a possibility
poses to traditional understandings of family, apart from any accounting or
interpretation of the biological facts. In divorcing families, step-parents may
be understood clearly as social parents, related to the children only through
marriage to one of the biological parents. The increasing incidence of divorce
and step-parent families in the last several decades has itself threatened the
traditional family; but that threat is understood as one of social change rather
than of changes in the very nature of things, and therein differs from the threat
to traditional notions of the family posed by gestational surrogacy cases. The
latter at once directly challenges traditional assumptions about both the
biological correlates of parentage and traditional assumptions about the
parameters of family.
c. The Biological and Social Facts of Family
To the extent that assumptions about biological facts continue to anchor
society's and the law's conceptions of what families are, shifts in the meaning
or use of those facts more seriously threaten traditional understandings of the
family than do shifts in what appear to be social patterns. Social patterns can
be altered, and later rejected; but biological facts, Western society has long
held, reflect the very nature of things and thus pose seemingly secure limits
to the definition of family. Gestational surrogacy cases present a particularly
dramatic challenge to that presumption-and a forceful symbol of the
traditional order's demise.
Gestational surrogacy simultaneously suggests both a new form of family
and a new understanding of the biological facts through which shifts in social
patterns might be understood and assimilated. As a result of this simultaneous
shift in our understanding of the social and biological facts of family, the
possibilities for new forms of family multiply accordingly. Ultimately, given
the astonishing range of options for reinterpreting the family that gestational
surrogacy suggests, the Johnson case is remarkable for the consistency with
which both parties invoked traditional views of family in arguing their
91. The Calverts declared:
The court [below] here found the best interests of the child would be served by the
judgment entered declaring the Calverts to be the legal parents. And further, the court
found that to inject Appellant [Johnson] into an intact family unit with a parental role
would not be in the best interests of the child.
Respondents' Answer to Amicus Curiae Brief by ACLU at 16, Anna J. v. Mark C., 286 Cal. Rptr. 369
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (No. G 010225) [hereinafter Answer to Amicus Curiae].
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respective cases: Each woman claiming to be the child's only mother premised
her maternity on her unique biological connection to the baby.
B. McDonald v. McDonald92
A New York case decided in 1994, McDonald v. McDonald offers a
comparative frame within which to examine anew the various claims about the
significance (and comparative significance) of the biological and social
parameters of parenthood asserted by the courts and the parties in Johnson.
A divorce action filed in New York in 1990, McDonald resembles Johnson
in that it too involved a dispute over the parentage of children born to a
gestational mother. In McDonald, however, the woman who intended from the
start to be the social mother provided the gestational-but not the
genetic-component of biological maternity. The case further differs from
Johnson in that the dispute in McDonald was between a man (a father) and a
woman (a mother) rather than between two women (or rather, one woman and
another woman together with her husband).
1. The Decision
The McDonalds, both doctors, married in 1988. Unsuccessful at conceiving
a child, the couple sought medical assistance from an infertility clinic.
Eventually, an embryo was created through the use of donor eggs, fertilized
by Robert McDonald's sperm. The embryos were implanted in Olga's uterus,
and in February, 1991 twin girls were born.93
Before the birth of the children, Robert filed for divorce. He sought sole
custody of both children. As described by a New York appellate court,94
Robert argued that he, as the "'only genetic and natural parent available,'""
92. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994).
93. Id. at 478.
94. Robert J. McDonald provides a very different story of the case, both in his briefs and supporting
papers and in two telephone interviews (July 7 and 8, 1994) (notes of interviews on file with author).
According to Robert, the case involved massive fraud on the part of his wife Olga and the infertility clinic.
In the first place, Robert asserts that he had been told originally that the babies were produced from donor
sperm and that his own sperm were probably inadequate to fertilize an egg. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant,
Robert J. McDonald at 8-9, McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (1994) (No. 91-08907) [hereinafter
McDonald Appellant Brief]. Moreover, Robert asserts that Olga had initially informed him that her
pregnancy had resulted from the fertilization of her own eggs. In fact, the pregnancy resulted from the
fertilization of donor egg. Id. at 6. At present, Robert continues his efforts to discover the identity of the
donor whose eggs, once fertilized with his sperm, resulted in the conception of the twin girls involved in
the case. The appellate division denied Robert's request that the medical records pertaining to the in vitro
fertilization and implantation be made available to him. The court declared:
Clearly, resolution of the custody issue in the instant case does not require revelation
of the wife's medical records concerning her in-vitro fertilization. . . .Since any
information regarding the egg donor is not relevant to the issue of custody in this case,
that branch of the husband's motion was properly denied.
McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
95. McDonald Appellant Brief, supra note 94, at 3.
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brought the superior claim to parentage. Accordingly, he contended that Olga,
as a gestational but not a genetic parent, should play no custodial role as long
as a genetic parent was available to do so.' The appellate division disagreed
and affirmed the trial court's grant of custody to Olga.97
From a biological perspective, the facts in McDonald are a mirror image
of those in Johnson. The two cases differ in that, in McDonald, the intending
mother was the gestational but not the genetic mother. In contrast, Crispina
Calvert was Christopher's genetic but not his gestational mother. Almost
reflexively, courts and others, including the media, have characterized the role
of the gestational mother entirely differently in the two sorts of cases. Anna
Johnson has been called a gestational surrogate and the case has been referred
to as a gestational surrogacy case.9" In contrast, Olga McDonald has been
described as a gestational mother, or as a mother who used donor eggs to
conceive her child. In either case, she has been described as a mother, and
McDonald has been characterized as an "ovum donor" case." The California
Supreme Court in Johnson justified those differences by concluding that, in
such cases, the intentional mother is the natural (and thus legal) mother. Some
commentators have posited that the class differences that often exist between
intentional mothers and gestational surrogates"°  have affected the
assumptions society and the law bring to such cases.'01 On the other hand,
class differences do not generally distinguish intentional/gestational mothers
from ovum donors.102
96. When the appellate division heard the case, the trial court had not granted a divorce. Thus the
case was heard pendente lite. As of early July, 1994, a divorce still had not been ordered. Telephone
Interview with Donna Harrison, Esq., attorney for Robert J. McDonald (July 7, 1994).
97. The court affirmed the trial court's order. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 481. The court ordered
that Olga retain custody temporarily, pending resolution of the custody dispute by the trial court. Id. at
480.
98. Id. at 479.
99. Id. at 480.
100. One study of 41 surrogate mothers found that 29% were receiving welfare or reported no income
at the time of insemination. The mean annual income of the remaining 71% of the women in the study
sample was $15,709. Nancy E. Reame & Philip J. Parker, Surrogate Pregnancy: Clinical Features of Forty-
four Cases, 162 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1220, 1221 (1990). Helena Ragone, in an
ethnographic analysis of surrogate mothers and intending couples, describes the two groups as differentiated
along class lines but reports that it "proved to be extremely difficult to persuade informants, either
surrogates or couples, to discuss these differences in a forthright manner." HELENA RAGONE, SURROGATE
MOTHERHOOD: CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 91 (1994). Ragone suggests that reluctance may be part of
a more general attempt on the part of participants in surrogacy programs to downplay aspects of surrogacy
that may be perceived as problematic. Id.
101. See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, When is a Mother Not a Mother? Surrogate Mother Case of Anna
Johnson, 251 THE NATION 825 (1990). Class differences probably do not distinguish intentional/gestational
mothers from ovum donors in the majority of cases. Many anonymously donated ova are provided by
women who are themselves undergoing infertility treatments. As a group such women are at least
moderately well off. Moreover, the very issue of class differences between gestationallintentional mothers
and ovum donors is usually masked for the parties because the identity of ovum donors, unlike that of
gestational surrogates, is usually not revealed to the intending parents. Similarly, the ovum donor generally
will not know the identity of the intending parents.
102. Women themselves undergoing infertility treatments are sometimes encouraged to donate ova
in exchange for reduced in vitro fertilization fees. This practice has been widely reported at hospitals in
Canada. Robin Harvey, Hospital Cuts Fees for Human Egg Donors, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 19, 1994,
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In fact, the appellate court in McDonald, like the state supreme court in
Johnson, found the intending mother to be the natural mother.1"3 Relying
expressly on the decision of the California Supreme Court in Johnson, the
McDonald court determined Olga to be the natural mother because she was
the intentional mother. McDonald relied on a footnote in Johnson in which the
court elaborated the implications of its decision that in cases of split biological
maternity, the woman whose "acted-on intention" caused the child to be
conceived and born should be named the child's natural, and thus only,
mother. The Johnson court explained: "Thus, under our analysis, in a true
'egg donation' situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child
formed from the egg of another woman with the intent to raise the child as her
own, the birth mother is the natural mother under California law. " "
Relying on that characterization, the McDonald court concluded:
In the case at bar, we have a true 'egg donation' situation, and
we find the reasoning of the Supreme Court of California on
this issue to be persuasive. Accordingly, the Supreme Court,
Queens County, correctly held that in the instant 'egg donation'
case, the wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural
mother of the children, and is, under the circumstances, entitled
to temporary custody of the children with visitation to the
husband .... 105
2. The Symbols of Reproduction
Robert, in claiming parentage and asking for sole custody of the
children, relied largely on his genetic connection to the babies and the absence
of a comparable connection between Olga and the twins. He described himself
as "the sole genetic parent among the parties" and Olga as a "genetic stranger"
to his children."°6 In large part, his arguments parallel the arguments asserted
at A2; Ban on Sale of Human Spenn, Eggs Sought, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 14, 1994, at A7. Health
Minister Diane Marleau has proposed legislation banning the practice. Id.
103. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d at 480. Arguably, the conclusion of the California Supreme Court in
Johnson, that the intentional mother was the "natural" mother, followed from parts of California's statutory
provisions that regulate the identification ofa child's "natural" parents even though those provisions clearly
were not formulated with gestational surrogacy in mind. In McDonald, however, the conclusion that Olga
McDonald was the twins' "natural" mother was not compelled by state statutory law. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Johnson, 851 P.2d 776, 782 n.10 (1993)).
105. Id. (citation and footnote omitted).
106. McDonald Appellant Brief, supra note 94, at 18-19. At the center of Robert's arguments to the
court was the "fraudulent conduct" allegedly committed by Olga and the fertility clinic in which she was
treated and which performed the in vitro fertilization that led to the conception of the babies. Id. at 27;
see Letter from Robert J. McDonald to Office of Professional Medical Conduct, New York State Dept.
of Health (July 25, 1991) (on file with author). Robert declared, for instance, that the misrepresentations
he claimed Olga made about the conception of the babies spoke to the nature of Olga's character and should
preclude Olga from serving as a custodial parent, especially since he, a "genetic" parent, was available
and anxious to become the sole custodial parent. McDonald Appellant Brief, supra note 94, at 19-20, 27.
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by the Calverts. However, unlike the Calverts, who presented themselves as
a traditional married couple, Robert asked for custody as a divorcing man and
single parent.
Olga's arguments to the court contrast with Robert's and with the
arguments presented by all the parties in Johnson in that Olga focused on the
social correlates of her maternity. Certainly, she described her biological
contribution to the babies' creation, but for the most part she presented that
contribution as evidence of her motherliness (a social matter) rather than as
evidence of an inexorable claim to natural maternity. For a number of reasons,
Olga, unlike Anna Johnson, was able to stress the maternal behavior she had
exhibited and continued to exhibit toward the children. In contrast, Anna
Johnson's ability to present herself as a good mother was curtailed by the very
fact of her entrance into the agreement to gestate and then foregoing maternal
claims to a baby. Moreover, Olga, although in the midst of divorce
proceedings, was married to the father of the babies she had gestated and borne
and thus had the advantage of having started her relationship to her twins in
a traditional mother-father-children triad. In addition, Olga, unlike Anna, had
retained custody after the children's births and had continued to serve as their
custodial parent. Finally, Olga's claims to maternity, unlike those of Anna,
opposed the claims of a father and not those of another mother. For all these
reasons, Olga was able to construct her case by relying on a set of arguments
that had not been available to Anna Johnson.
Olga explicitly distinguished Johnson from her own case. She submitted
her brief prior to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson, which,
to Olga's benefit, relied on maternal intent to establish natural maternity.
Refuting the relevance of the lower court rulings in Johnson, Olga declared
that she could not be described as a "surrogate.""17 She further asserted:
In the instant case, there is no contest between the egg
donor and the respondent [Olga] for custody, and therefore it
is still a one (1) mother/one (1) father scenario. There is no
need for this Court to be concerned about the psychological
impact it might have on a child to be brought up with two (2)
mothers.
Conversely, it is the appellant who would like to deprive the
children [of] the only mother that they have ever known. It is
respectfully submitted that such deprivation would in fact have
a devastating effect upon the children.
This Court is not bound by the Calvert ruling and may find
that there is much more significance to the individual who
actually gives the children life. In the analysis of the instant
107. Brief for Defendant-Respondent, Olga B. McDonald at 24, McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (No.
91-08907) (1994) [hereinafter McDonald Respondent Brief].
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case, it is important to note that the child was born during a
legal marriage and therefore is presumed to be the legitimate
issue of both parents.108
Certainly, Olga referred to her gestational role as a significant aspect of
her maternity. However, in describing that role, she stressed the pain and
suffering that the production of ova and the subsequent pregnancy had brought
her, rather than the physiological processes of maternal bonding on which
Anna Johnson had focused. Olga portrayed the history of her pregnancy in
detail. In so doing, she focused on her own endurance, and asserted that
Robert had continually attempted to undermine the pregnancy's success. For
instance, Olga claimed she responded to an early period of spotting in the
pregnancy with devastation and grief. In contrast, she proclaimed that Robert
expressed delight that "'the experiment had failed.'""° She further described
Robert as having thought of the developing fetuses as "'freaks, monsters and
anomalies,'"" 0 and to have urged termination of the pregnancy. Olga said
that later stages of the pregnancy brought her continuing anxiety and illness.
Each diagnostic sonogram, she reported, "was a veritable nightmare" for
her."' Later, beset with serious symptoms caused by the pregnancy, Olga
chose to continue the pregnancy rather than risk a seriously premature birth.
She described the significance and consequences of her decision to the court:
The respondent decided to sacrifice her own life and try to
endure the complicated pregnancy a little longer so that the
children could be born healthy and normal. The toxemia got so
much worse that the respondent experienced swelling all over
her body, had extensive nose bleeds and was totally unable to
walk, and required a wheelchair to get around." 2
At the birth Olga, treated with local rather than general anesthesia, was "aware
of every incision, cut, contraction and the incredible pain, yet was only
concerned about the welfare of the children. Out of that near death experience
came two very healthy and beautiful girls . . . .
Olga's biological maternity, as she described it, involved almost unrelenting
emotional and physical agony from conception through birth. For Olga, her
constant sacrifice and courage during that period indicate the quality of her
maternity. Thus, she claimed that her experiences and reactions during
108. Id. at 25-26.
109. Id. at 7.
110. Id. at 8.
111. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id. at 12 (citation omitted).
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pregnancy, especially when compared with Robert's disdain, proved her the
better parent.
Alongside this characterization of her pregnancy and her maternity, Olga
presented another type of argument about the biology of reproduction. She
suggested that the new options for human reproduction made available by
technological advances such as in vitro fertilization call for a far-reaching
reevaluation of the social implications of biological maternity and paternity.
"This Court must recognize," Olga declared, "that such onerous terms, like
'genetic stranger', [sic] have no place in a world which has embraced new
reproductive technology as a necessary means to assist individuals in their
desires to procreate."114 This argument rests on the presumption that
reproductive technology is good. Olga supported that presumption by arguing
that reproductive technology provides a new set of solutions to an old and
troubling problem-the problem of infertility. Using herself as an example,
Olga asserted that she, "[ 1]ike many individuals . . . so desperately desired to
either bear a child or have one borne for her, that she turned to the advances
of medical technology to assist her in that important goal."'5
Thus, Olga argued that reproductive technology should rightly be viewed
as a means for relieving human suffering-suffering created by the absence
of family-and that the requisite reinterpretation of human reproduction could
therefore be justified by reference to the significance of family. Olga's strategy
has been identified and analyzed by the English anthropologist Marilyn
Strathern, who writes: "Arguments in favour of embracing the new
reproductive technologies can point to them as techniques that will alleviate
suffering and provide remedies for disability, and thus enable the family to take
its proper and traditional form."16 For Olga, a societal decision to adopt
reproductive technology preserves traditional families by helping to create
them. The likelihood that this decision may challenge society's most
fundamental assumptions about the biological correlates of family is presented
as essentially inconsequential. Thus, Olga suggests that parentage should not
be exclusively premised on a genetic connection between parent and child.
In place of that familiar assumption, she offers a view of family epitomized
by her own sacrificial role as the gestator of her twin daughters. Olga pled that
the social implications of biological reproduction be reexamined while
appealing that the essence of the traditional family-which she identified as
love-be preserved. Thus, Olga described gestation as one stage in the
"nourishment and care" that a good mother gives her children." 7 Genetics
does not produce that concern. In a remarkable twist on traditional definitions
114. Id. at 16.
115. Id. at 17.
116. Strathern, supra note 19, at 6.
117. McDonald Respondent Brief, supra note 107, at 21-22.
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of family, Olga characterized Robert's concern with his genetic connection to
the twins as evidence that he would be a bad father. She asserted:
It was not until the appellant learned of his paternity did [sic]
he begin to illustrate a desire to be a parent to the twins. In
effect, his love for the children was conditioned upon his
genetic link to the children. Now he is asking this Court to
award his [sic] custody based upon his genetics alone."'
For Olga, the invocation of family-even of traditional family-in this new
context requires a shift in old assumptions. Those assumptions grounded
traditional views of family in the inevitability of natural truth. Without such
assumptions, the notion of enduring, committed relationships that traditionally
describes and constitutes the family lacks a sustaining force.
Thus, in McDonald, as in Johnson, parties associate their opposing cases
with tradition. Robert McDonald relied on his exclusive genetic connection to
the children and suggested that, in comparison, Olga was a stranger seeking
custody of his children. 9 He ignored Olga's gestational role in order to
assert that only he and his children could constitute a traditional family, one
in which the parent-child bond was grounded in natural truth.
Olga also premised her claim to maternity on tradition. She defined herself
in terms of traditional portraits of a good mother-self-sacrificing, loving,
unendingly committed to her children. She connected that self-portrait to her
biological (gestational) role, 2 ° but she also proposed that the aavent of
reproductive technology necessitated new understandings of parent and child.
In effect, she suggested that the social and biological dimensions of parenthood
be disassociated, so that the social dimension might be preserved in its most
traditional form. In this vision, for instance, "good mothers," even if infertile,
might be enabled to create families and to raise children who would benefit
from their mothers' loving care.
IV. WHAT IS AN EMBRYO?-OR IS IT AN EMBRYO?
Disputes involving the disposition of frozen embryos resemble those
involving children produced as a result of gestational surrogacy arrangements
or ovum donation in that the invocation of biological facts furthers a larger
debate about the nature and future of the family. Here too, arguments
apparently about the biological facts of human reproduction serve as a pretext
118. Id. at 21.
119. McDonald Appellant Brief, supra note 94, at 18-19.
120. Olga did assert, though without any commentary, that she had "a 'blood relationship' with the
children during the pregnancy inasmuch as her blood provided the children with oxygen and nutrients which
were vital to their development." McDonald Respondent Brief, supra note 107, at 26.
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for voicing and resolving controversies about the meaning and limits of
personhood.
A. A New Time and Space for Human Reproduction: In Vitro
Fertilization and Cryopreserved Embryos
In 1978, Louise Brown, the first baby conceived in vitro, was born in
England. 2' Six years later in Australia, another child conceived in vitro was
born." In the Australian case, however, the embryo"z  was cryopreserved
(frozen)'24 and only later thawed and implanted in the uterus of the woman
from whose body the ovum had been extracted." z Thus, within an
extraordinarily short period of time, both the spatial and temporal dimensions
of human reproduction became subject to technological manipulation. For the
first time in history, human reproduction could begin outside a woman's body
and be suspended for long periods of time after conception and before further
development of the embryo. In vitro fertilization and the cryopreservation of
early embryos undermine the assumption that human reproduction is spatially
contiguous and temporally continuous. The consequent disruption to traditional
views of the family can be profound. In theory, cryopreservation allows a
woman to become the mother of her own sister or aunt. 26 Already, women
121. JENNIFER GUNNING & VERONICA ENGLISH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION: A CASE STUDY
IN THE REGULATION OF MEDICAL INNOVATION 11 (1993). For more information about the problem of
infertility and in vitro fertilizationas a therapy, see Howard W. Jones & James Toner, The Infertile Couple,
329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1710, 1714 (1993).
122. Judy Licht, Frozen in Time, WASH. POST, Nov. 26, 1991, at Z10.
123. This Article uses the term embryo to refer to the earliest stages of embryonic development. As
this section will discuss, much of the controversy about the moral and biological status of early embryos
has been played out as a debate about definitions. Thus parties variously label the ovum, soon after
fertilization, a "fertilized ovum," a blastocyst, a zygote, a pre-embryo or an embryo.
124. There are various methods of freezing embryos. One that has been successful involves slow
cooling in a cryoprotectant to a temperature of between 30 and 40 centigrade degrees below zero. Once
frozen, the embryos may be stored in liquid nitrogen. Robert M.L. Winston & Alan H. Handyside, New
Challenges in Human In Vitro Fertilization, 260 SCIENCE 932, 933 (1993).
125. ANDREA L. BONNICKSEN, IN VrrRo FERTILIZATION: BUILDING POLICY FROM LABORATORIES
TO LEGISLATURES 30 (1989); A. Trounson & L. Mohr, Human Pregnancy Following Cryopreservation,
Thawing, and Transfer of an Eight-Cell Embryo, 305 NATURE 707 (1983).
In 1981, English Drs. Robert Edwards and Patrick Steptoe first announced that human embryos could
be successfully frozen, stored, and later thawed for use. Perry Clifton & L. Kristen Schneider,
Cryopreserved Embryos: Who Shall Decide Their Fate?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 463, 463 n.2 (1992). In the
United States, the first live birth using a thawed embryo occurred in 1985. Richard P. Marrs et al.,
Successfid Pregnancies from Cryopreserved Human Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization, 156 AM.
J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1503 (1986).
The American Fertility Society reported in 1990 that over 23,000 frozen embryos were being stored
in the United States and that about 350 babies had been born from cryopreserved embryos. LIcHT, supra
note 122, at Z10.
126. A woman, call her Sue, could become the mother of her own sibling if the gamete donors (Sue's
parents) had an embryo cryopreserved and then, years later, that embryo was thawed and implanted in Sue's
uterus. Sue could then gestate and give birth to the resulting baby. Had the embryo in question developed
in vivo, without the interruption that cryopreservation allows, the embryo would have been born a
generation earlier as its mother Sue's "sister" or "brother." Similarly, a woman could become mother to
her aunt or uncle in a case in which the cryopreserved embryo was donated by her grandparents rather
than by her parents. Obviously the use of the words "sister," "brother," and "aunt," as well as "mother,"
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give birth to babies a number of years apart who might have been fraternal
twins had not some or all of the embryos been frozen and stored for later
use. 127
The advent of in vitro fertilization and cryopreservation necessitates that
the law settle controversies about the rights to and the rights of frozen
embryos. Several types of disputes have arisen in the wake of these new
reproductive technologies. One line of cases has involved disputes between
gamete donors and the infertility clinics that helped to create and store their
embryos. 2 Additionally, there have been disputes between two gamete
donors who have had embryos frozen for future implantation, but later decided
not to become parents together as a result of their deteriorating relationship.
Davis v. Davis129 is an example of this type of case.
Unlike gestational surrogacy cases, frozen embryo cases have a relatively
long, impassioned, and self-conscious history, because of the controversy about
the legality of, and limits upon, abortion. The abortion debate has been marked
by unending and generally inconclusive appeals to the biological correlates of
embryonic development.
Those appeals were given legal significance by the framework within which
the Supreme Court analyzed the abortion issue in Roe v. Wade.'3' In Roe,
the states of Texas and Georgia, whose abortion statutes were under
constitutional attack, argued that the protection of fetal life constituted a
"compelling state interest" that justified infringing on the privacy interests of
pregnant women wanting to terminate their pregnancies. The Supreme Court,
in response, expressly refused to "resolve the difficult question of when life
begins," 3' but agreed that the privacy interests of a pregnant woman are not
absolute. The Court concluded that the state's "interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life" counterbalances the rights of a woman seeking an
could be subjected to vigorous debate.
127. In 1993, a Virginia woman gave birth to her third child using eggs that were fertilized several
years earlier. This was said to be the first time that three pregnancies resulted from three eggs that were
all removed and fertilized at one time and then cryopreserved for future use. Baby Born from Frozen Eggs,
WASH. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1993, at Cl.
128. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989). The case involved a dispute between The
Howard and Georgeanna Jones Institute for Reproductive Medicine in Norfolk, Virginia, and a couple,
Steven York and Risa Adler-York, who had been treated for infertility at the Institute. During the course
of that treatment, the Yorks had one embryo cryopreserved for possible later implantation. However, before
that implantation was attempted, the Yorks moved to Los Angeles, and therefore asked the Jones Institute
to transfer their frozen embryo to a fertility clinic in that city. The Institute refused. A federal district court
in Virginia, relying on the terms of the Cryopreservation Agreement between the Yorks and the Institute,
concluded that the Agreement had created a bailor-bailee relationship between the Yorks and the clinic.
The court found that the Jones Institute had "fully recognize[d] plaintiffs' property rights in the pre-zygote
and . . . limited [its own] rights as bailee to exercise dominion and control over the pre-zygote." Id. at
427.
129. No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, No. 180,
1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept 13, 1990), aff'd, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert.
denied sub nom Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
130. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
131. Id. at 159.
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abortion at the point of fetal "viability. "132 The Court explained this
conclusion:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so
because the fetus then presumably has the capability of
meaningful life outside the mother's womb. State regulation
protective of fetal life after viability thus has both logical and
biological justifications.t33
Thus, in the law regulating abortion after Roe, conclusions about the point at
which life begins were displaced by more concrete, though changing,
conclusions about the point of fetal viability. Roe promised to displace
theological debate, at least within the universe of legal discourse, with
empirical observation. Roe thus appeared, at least momentarily, to justify its
trimester approach to the regulation of abortion. However, after Roe, the
biological facts of embryonic development remained as significant as ever to
the law's regulation of abortion. 3" And within the larger society, Roe has
intensified, rather than stilled, the controversy about when life begins. 135
Since Roe, a woman's right to abortion before viability has been premised
on her privacy right to control her body. At both the beginning and the end
of pregnancy, that rationale is threatened by technological advances that permit
fetal development outside a woman's body. Roe, common sense, and most of
Western theology and philosophy state clearly that, once born, a baby (even
if still exhibiting what would previously have been fetal development) is a
person and therefore cannot be killed. However, no comparable agreement
exists about the existential or moral status of the embryo during the earliest
stages of development. This disagreement is problematic because, through in
vitro fertilization, embryos can be conceived outside a woman's body and can
develop there for at least several days. Of course, those embryos are not viable
(as the term was used in Roe) because they cannot develop into babies unless
132. Id. at 162-63. The Court placed the point of viability at about 28 weeks, noting that in some cases
viability could occur as early as 24 weeks. Id. at 160 & n.59 (relying on L. HELLMAN & J. PRITCHARD,
WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 493 (14th ed. 1971)). Since Roe, the point of fetal viability has been located a few
weeks earlier than was the case at the time of the decision. Dissenting in Akron v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1982) (declaring unconstitutional second trimester hospitalization
requirement for abortions), Justice O'Connor asserted that the trimester framework on the basis of which
the Court decided Roe was being called into question as a result of advances in medical technology. Id.
at 458 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In Roe, the Court also concluded that the privacy right of a pregnant woman to abort a pregnancy
is counterbalanced by the state's interest in protecting the woman's health "at approximately the end of
the first trimester." 410 U.S. at 163.
133. Id.
134. See Nancy K. Rhoden, Trimesters and Technology: Revamping Roe v. Wade, 95 YALE L.J. 639
(1986) (suggesting that legal decisions about regulation of abortion be separated from biological
justifications).
135. See MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 42-46 (1987).
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implanted in a woman's uterus for gestation beyond the first few days of
development. However, embryos produced through in vitro fertilization can
survive outside the body and, if frozen, may be available years after their
creation for implantation and gestation in a woman's uterus. Thus, they may
lead eventually to the birth of a child.
This possibility has required the legal system once again to consider when
life begins. Thousands of embryos are now being stored at fertility clinics in
the United States. 36 Some will be implanted in the woman from whose
ovaries the ova were extracted; some will be implanted in other women, as
gestational surrogates or intentional mothers; 137 some will be used for
research;' 38 and others eventually will be discarded. If, however, as some
argue, 139  early embryos are human life, the entire enterprise and, in
particular, any decision to discard a frozen embryo becomes problematic. As
a result of this controversy, in a number of recent cases involving the fate of
frozen embryos, courts have been asked to decide the status and fate of
cryopreserved embryos."4
136. See BONNICKSEN, supra note 125.
137. Gestational surrogate is used here to refer to a woman who gestates a child for another woman
or couple; intentional mother is used to refer to a woman who intends to gestate and raise a child conceived
with donated ova.
138. Between 1980 and the spring of 1993, embryo research in the United States was prohibited except
in privately funded clinics. In June 1993, the federal government lifted the ban on the funding of embryo
research, making it possible once again to obtain federal funding for such research. Boyce Rensberger,
NIH Panel Looks at Ethics, Standards for Human Embryo Research, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1994, at A3.
139. Probably the most well-known and forceful advocate of the position that a human being exists
at conception is the Catholic Church, which holds that:
[TIhe fruit of human generation from the first moment of its existence, that is to say,
from the moment the zygote has formed, demands the unconditional respect that is
morally due to the human being in his bodily and spiritual totality. The human being
is to be respected and treated as a person from the moment of conception and therefore
from that same moment his rights as a person must be recognized, among which in
the first place is the inviolable right of every innocent human being to life.
SACRED CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF FAITH, Instruction on Respectfor Human Life in Its Origin
and On the Dignity of Procreation, in THE GIFT OF LIFE: THE PROCEEDINGS OF A NATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON THE VATICAN INSTRUCTION ON REPRODUCTIVE ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY app. at 211 (Marilyn
Wallace & Thomas W. Hilgers eds., 1990).
140. In addition to Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (considered infra sub-section IV(B)),
see, e.g., York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989) (involving dispute between gamete donors
and infertility clinic about possible transfer of frozen embryo to another clinic).
An Australian case, heralded in the media and elsewhere as the tale of "frozen embryo orphans"
involved a wealthy California couple, Mario and Elsa Rios who went to Australia to receive in vitro
fertilization treatments. Several embryos resulted from the treatment; two were frozen for later use. The
Rinses were then killed in a plane crash. The case led to questions about the fate of the frozen embryos
and their potential right to inherit an intestate share of the Rioses' large estate. See George P. Smith II,
Australia's Frozen 'Orphan' Embryos: A Medical, Legal and Ethical Dilemma, 24 J. FAM. L. 27, 27-28
(1985-86).
A more recent case, with facts similar to those that were at issue in Davis, is developing in New York.
The case involves a divorcing couple, contesting the fate of five frozen embryos created in the course of
infertility treatments. Frozen Embryos' Fate Awaits L.I. Custody Battle, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1994, at
A25.
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B. Davis v. Davis: Were the Embryos Children, Property, Or
Something In Between?
Davis14 ' arose as a divorce proceeding between Junior Lewis Davis and
his wife Mary Sue Davis. Married to Junior in 1980, Mary Sue Davis suffered
a series of ectopic pregnancies that resulted in the loss of her fallopian tubes.
Then, in 1985, the couple entered an in vitro fertilization program at a
Knoxville infertility clinic. The in vitro procedure was tried without success
several times during the next few years. In 1988, on the advice of their
infertility doctor, the couple decided to cryopreserve embryos for future use
should Mary Sue not become pregnant. In December 1988, nine ova were
retrieved. Two were implanted, but did not result in pregnancy. The remaining
seven were cryopreserved and stored in the Knoxville clinic. Two months
later, in February 1989, the Davises' marriage failed. 1
4 2
The couple agreed about all the terms of their divorce except the
disposition of the seven frozen embryos. At first, Mary Sue hoped to use the
embryos to become pregnant herself. She later remarried (becoming Mary Sue
Stowe) and requested that the embryos be donated to an infertile couple. 43
Junior Davis opposed both uses, proposing instead that the embryos be stored
indefinitely.'" Later, he asked that the embryos be destroyed.'4 5
1. The Decisions
In the course of litigation, three Tennessee courts heard the case. One held
for Mary Sue and two for Junior. However, each of the three courts relied on
a different view of the embryos' existential status. To Judge Young of the trial
court, the embryos were children. "The Court finds and concludes," he
asserted, "that the seven cryopreserved embryos are human."" 4 For Judge
Young, that conclusion delineated what he then described as the essential
question in the case: "What then is the legal status to be accorded a human
being existing as an embryo, in vitro, in a divorce case in the state of
141. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nor.; Stowe v. Davis, 113 S.Ct. 1259 (1993).
142. 842 S.W.2d at 591-92.
143. Brief for Appellee at 13, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) [hereinafter Davis
Appellee Brief]; Initial Brief for Appellant at 8, Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) [hereinafter
Davis Appellant Brief].
144. Id. at 589. Indefinite storage was understood as "tantamount to destruction" since at the time
it was believed that frozen embryos would likely not be viable after a couple of years. Davis v. Davis,
No. E. 14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *36. Dr. Charles A. Shivers, an embryologist at the
Fertility Center of East Tennessee in Knoxville, who was responsible for the cryopreservation of the
Davises' seven embryos, testified at trial. He stated that although mice embryos had been successfilly
frozen for a decade, cryopreserved human embryos had not previously remained frozen and viable for more
than approximately two years. Id. Appendix B at *70 (summarizing testimony of witnesses).
145. Davis Appellant Brief, supra note 143, at 8.
146. Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *13.
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Tennessee?"' 47 He answered, expressly asserting the court's parens patriae
power:
[Ilt is to the manifest best interest of the children, in vitro, that
they be made available for implantation to assure their
opportunity for live birth; implantation is their sole and only
hope for survival. The Court respectfully finds and concludes
that it further serves the best interest of these children for Mrs.
Davis to be permitted the opportunity to bring these children
to term through implantation. 1
48
The court further vested "temporary custody of the parties' seven cryogenically
preserved human embryos" in Mary Sue. 149
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee reversed., In the appellate court's
decision, the trial court's focus on the moral and existential status of the
embryos disappears and was replaced by a focus on outcome. "[T]he sole issue
on appeal," declared the appellate court, "is essentially who is entitled to
control seven of Mary Sue's ova fertilized by Junior's sperm .. ,150 The
court concluded that the fertilized ova would be afforded a status somewhere
between property and body organs available for transplant. Citing the Uniform
Anatomical Gift Act, 5 ' as passed in Tennessee, the court concluded that
Mary Sue and Junior shared "an interest" in the cryopreserved embryos and,
accordingly, vested "joint control" in both of them.'52 The decisions went
further toward defining the embryos' status than toward determining their
practical fate.
The state supreme court affirmed the holding of the appellate court, but
distanced itself from any implication in that court's opinion that the parties'
interest in the embryos was "in the nature of a property interest. ""' The
court explained:
[P]reembryos are not, strictly speaking, either "persons" or
"property," but occupy an interim category that entitles them
to special respect because of their potential for human life. It
follows that any interest that Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis
have in the preembryos in this case is not a true property
interest. However, they do have an interest in the nature of
147. Id. at *31.
148. Id. at *37.
149. Id.
150. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *1 (emphasis added).
151. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 596 (citing The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, TENN. CODE. ArN. § 68-
30-101 (1992), which regulates the disposition of organs at death and the disposition of other body organs
and tissues that lack the capacity for developing autonomous life.)
152. Davis, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS at *8-9.
153. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596 (Tenn. 1992).
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ownership, to the extent that they have decision-making
authority concerning disposition of the preembryos, within the
scope of policy set by law.'54
In its conclusions and holding, however, the state supreme court evaded the
question of how to respect cryopreserved embryos and turned instead to the
interests and rights of the gamete donors. The court finally decided that, given
the lack of either a current or prior agreement between the parties about the
embryos, it became necessary to weigh the "relative interests of the parties
in using or not using the preembryos . "..."155 The court wrote:
Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should
prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable
possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than the use
of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable
alternatives exist, then argument[s] in favor of using the
preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered.
However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends
merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party
obviously has the greater interest and should prevail. 5 6
In the aftermath of the decision, the embryos were transmitted to Junior Davis
by the Knoxville Infertility clinic, which had stored them for over four years.
In June 1993, Davis announced that he had had the embryos destroyed."5 7
2. The "Biological Facts"
Each of the three state courts that rendered opinions in Davis, as well as
the parties and amici curiae who presented arguments to the courts, reviewed
the biological facts of embryonic creation and development in order to justify
the decision reached or desired. Thus, while the parties (along with amici
curiae) disagreed about the description, the definition, and the personhood of
the embryos, they used the same medical facts surrounding in vitro fertilization
to support their respective claims.
This case differed from Johnson v. Calvert in that the opposing parties in
Davis had each donated a gamete to produce the embryos. Thus, neither party
could use the biological facts (as they are now generally understood)' to
154. Id. at 597.
155. Id. at 604.
156. Id.
157. Mark Curriden, Embryo Fight Yields Few Answers: Disposal Disclosed: Embryos Are Discarded
in a Tennessee Case, but Legal and Ethical Questions Remain, ATLANTA J. & CONST., June 14, 1993,
at A2.
158. Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French geneticist who testified for Mary Sue Davis at trial, did assert
that the gamete provided by the male is not genetically comparable to that provided by the female. He
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demonstrate a greater or more natural relation to the embryos. 1 9 Rather, the
parties in Davis invoked biological facts to argue for different conceptions of
what an "embryo" is, in hopes of defining the controversy such that the fate
of the embryos would be decided as each party, respectively, desired.
The briefs and the arguments presented to the courts in Davis suggest three
broad views of the embryos' existential status. Each of the three views was
adopted by one of the three courts that rendered decisions in the case. The trial
court viewed the embryos as children, and therefore understood the case as
a custody battle between two parents. The intermediate appellate court viewed
the embryos as animate commodities, much as other courts have viewed
genetically-engineered matter. 60 The court therefore framed the case to
resemble a property dispute between divorcing spouses. Finally, the state
supreme court sought a middle course, one that avoided expressly viewing the
embryos as either people or property. The court determined that the embryos,
although not persons, were entitled to "special respect because of their
potential for human life." 6' This view allowed the court to bypass the
interests of the embryos (which would be compelling if they were children),
while allowing the court to distinguish its treatment of the embryos from the
treatment it would afford inanimate commodities in another case.
In fact, the Tennessee Supreme Court focused on much more than respect
for the embryos. The court appeared to invoke, almost equally, a world of
contractual negotiations and a world concerned with the preservation of
people's (in this case, the gamete donors') constitutional rights in the context
of intimate familial relationships. The court encouraged the use of pre-
fertilization contracts between gamete donors interested in together becoming
the parents of a child, and suggested that the terms of such contracts be
conclusive in future disputes. 62  In cases that lack such contractual
agreements, the court suggested focusing, as it did in Davis, on the interests
argued that certain sorts of genetic information are carried by sperm and other sorts of information are
carried by ova. Transcript of Proceedings, Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Aug. 10, 1989),
Vol. III, at 41 [hereinafter Davis Trial Transcript].
159. The biological facts, as generally presented by today's scientific community, prevent both sides
from invoking those facts to demonstrate a greater right to the embryos. In fact, however, folk-culture
often ignores the scientific view of gametic donation-which views the male and female gametes as similar
apart from the X and Y chromosomes-in order to view the donation of the male as superior to that of the
female. Helena Ragone notes the use of this folk-theory among surrogate mothers who hope to "devalue
[their] own biological contribution and link to the child." HELENE RAGONE, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
CONCEPTION IN THE HEART 125 (1994). Ragone continues, "In this way, participants focus upon the folk
theory of reproduction, which is made possible by the fact that even though in the realm of scientific
knowledge, women are acknowledged to be co-creators, 'in Europe and America, the knowledge that
women are[ . . .I co-creators[ . . .] has not been encompassed symbolically.'"
Id. (quoting Carol Delaney, The Meaning of Paternity and the Virgin Birth Debate, 24 MAN 497, 509
(1986) (alteration in the original)).
160. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (concluding that living things can be patented
under federal patent law).
161. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
162. See supra note 155 and accompanying text (quoting court's suggestions for handling this and
future disputes involving cryopreserved embryos).
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of the gamete donors. Thus, in the end, the state supreme court in Davis did
not decide that it would consistently treat embryos as having a status
intermediate between that of people and that of property. Rather, the court held
that treatment of disputes over embryos should vary depending upon the
existence of an agreement. Where an agreement exists, the court will treat the
dispute more like one involving property. On the other hand, when there was
no agreement between the gamete donors, the court will treat the dispute more
like one involving family members. Thus, although the court premised its
conclusions on the "special respect" owed embryos "because of their potential
for human life," 63 the decision in fact reflected concern for the gamete
donors instead. More specifically, the decision did not respect the embryos,
except to the extent that the embryos' interests were encompassed by the
interests of the donors. Moreover, the donors were respected only insofar as
the court, unable to rely on an agreement between them, focused on their
procreational autonomy as protected by the Constitution.
In fact, none of the three courts' respective conclusions about the existential
status of the embryos necessitated the holding that each court reached about
the fate of the embryos. Their conclusions about the embryos' status did,
however, establish the terms of the debate. For instance, a conclusion that the
embryos are (or resemble) children establishes that the case should be handled
as a custody dispute. Within that dispute, the court theoretically could have
decided that the best interests of the embryonic children lay with perpetual
storage, with donation to an infertile couple, or with some other use or
disposition. Similarly, a conclusion that the embryos are, or resemble, property
establishes that the case should be handled by reference to the parties'
comparative claims to control the property at stake. That perspective does not,
however, clearly dictate the proper use or disposition of the Davis embryos.
While the rhetoric in Davis does not necessitate a particular outcome, it
serves a very important role in structuring the current debate about family.
Clearly, Davis was about far more than the fate of seven embryos.
Encompassing that controversy is a much more significant debate about the
meaning and parameters, indeed the very nature, of the family and of the
individuals who compose families. The case provided a concrete forum in
which the larger debate could be conducted.
In carrying on that larger debate, the parties consistently invoked the
biological facts of embryonic development. As in Johnson, each side claimed
that the weight of scientific truth demonstrated the unique validity of its
perspective and its proposed use for the disputed embryos. And, as in Johnson,
the invocation of biological facts proved generally inconclusive. No conclusions
about the status of the embryos could fairly be derived from the total testimony
of the medical experts. Yet each court relied on some of that testimony to
justify its view of the embryos and its conclusions about their fate.
163. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597.
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Of the three courts that heard the case, the trial court most emphatically
embraced biological facts to support its conclusions about the embryos'
existential and moral status. That court relied heavily on the interpretations of
Dr. Jerome Lejeune, a French geneticist who testified for Mary Sue Davis at
trial. Dr. Lejeune was known in the scientific world for his discovery of the
chromosome responsible for Down's Syndrome. He had been appointed in
1974 by the Pope as a member of the Pontifical Academy of Sciences and had
worked actively to have abortion declared illegal." Dr. Lejeune premised
his arguments for Mary Sue Davis on the position that in vitro fertilization
does not differ fundamentally from fertilization within a woman's body. After
describing the process of fertilization within a woman's body, Dr. Lejeune
asserted:
It is not at all the inseminator who makes fertilization, he just
puts on the right medium, a ripe ovum, active sperm, and it is
the sperm who make the fertilization. Man would be unable to
make a fertilization. It has to be done directly by the cells. And
it's because they were normally floating in the fluid that this
extracorporeal technique is at all possible.
Now, the reproduction process is a very impressive
phenomenon in the sense that what is reproduced is never the
matter, but it is information.' 6
In this statement, Dr. Lejeune attempted to support two arguments. First,
he wanted to establish that embryos produced through in vitro fertilization are
no different from embryos produced through sexual intercourse. Second, he
set the scientific stage for concluding that the embryos, cryopreserved at the
four-to-eight-cell stage, represent unique human beings, just as they would had
they been conceived and allowed to develop in a woman's body. Dr. Lejeune
argued that because each embryo contains all the information necessary to
produce a unique human being even before the eight-cell stage, each is a
human being. "[S]cience," he asserted, "has a very simple conception of man;
as soon as he has been conceived, a man is a man." '66 When Charles
Clifford, Junior Davis' attorney, asked whether a zygote167 deserves "the
same respect as an adult human being,"' 68 Dr. Lejeune responded:
164. Professor Jerome Lejeune (obituary), THE TIMEs (London), Apr. 7, 1994.
Dr. Lejeune stated at trial that he was also a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences,
the Royal Society of Medicine in London, the Royal Society of Science in Stockholm, the Science Academy
in Italy, the Acaddmie des Sciences Morales et Politiques of the Institut de France in Paris, and the
Academy of Medicine in France. Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 158, at 11.
165. Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 158, at 23.
166. Id. at 48.
167. The term "zygote" generally refers to the fertilized ovum immediately after fertilization occurs.
Davis, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *65 (summarizing testimony of Dr. Ray King, director of the
Fertility Center of East Tennessee where the Davises' embryos were stored).
168. Davis Trial Transcript, supra note 158, at 78.
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I'm not telling you that because I'm not in [the] position of
knowing that. I'm telling you, he is a human being, and then
it is a Justice who will tell whether this human being has the
same rights as the others. . . . But as a geneticist you ask me
whether this human being is a human, and I would tell you that
because he is a being and being human, he is a human
being. 169
After discussing the implications of cryopreserving cells,70 Dr. Lejeune
suggested that alternatives to in vitro fertilization and the cryopreservation of
any resulting embryos were on the horizon. He further suggested that these
alternatives offered biologically and socially superior results to those produced
through present methods. "[L]ove," he declared, "is the contrary [sic] of
chilly. Love is warmth. .... [T]he best we can do for early human beings is
to have them in their normal shelter, not in the fridge."171
Dr. Lejeune was one of five experts who testified at trial.'72 He alone
testified that, as a scientific matter, human life begins at conception; yet the
trial court relied on Dr. Lejeune's testimony for just that conclusion, which
it proclaimed in a list of 12 "findings of fact and conclusions of law resulting
in judgment."' 73 Reviewing Dr. Lejeune's scientific testimony and comparing
it with that of other expert witnesses,7 4 the court concluded that nothing in
the testimony of the other experts effectively disputed Dr. Lejeune's assertion
that the cells of an early embryo are differentiated. In describing the early
embryo's cells as "differentiated," Dr. Lejeune supported the contention that
the early embryo is unique, autonomous and human-thus, "an early human
being."
Whatever the validity of Dr. Lejeune's controversial conclusions about the
biology of early embryos, they hardly compel the conclusion that 4-cell
embryos are human beings. However, Dr. Lejeune's testimony and the court's
characterization of that testimony dramatically illustrate how the facts of nature
are used to justify social and moral conclusions. The court justified its holding
by referring to Dr. Lejeune's explanation of the biological facts of embryonic
development, even though it acknowledged that Dr. Lejeune's conclusions
about the differentiation of cells in early embryos were "highly technical,
169. Id. at 79.
170. Id. at 26-30.
171. Id. at 51.
172. Eight witnesses testified. Five were certified as experts. Davis v. Davis, No. E-14496, 1989
Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, at *10.
173. Id. at *1-2.
174. The other experts who testified at trial were: Professor John A. Robertson, Baker and Botts
Professor of Law at the University of Texas at Austin, Texas; Dr. Irving Ray King, medical doctor and
director of the Fertility Center of East Tennessee in Knoxville; Dr. Charles A. Shivers, Head of the
Department of Zoology at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville; and Deborah Cooper McCarter, RN,
primary patient coordinator at Dr. King's IVF Clinic. The court summarized the testimony of these, and
other witnesses in Appendix B to its opinion. Id. at *61-72.
[Vol. 7: 37
Reproductive Transformations
incapable of observation by the Court and require[d] the Court to either accept
or reject the scientist's conclusion." 75
At least two broadly dissimilar strategies can be employed in response to
Dr. Lejeune's testimony and to the trial court's conclusions based on that
testimony. First, an alternative description and/or interpretation of the
biological facts might be presented to dispute the details, or the implications,
of Dr. Lejeune's testimony. Second, the biological facts might be by-passed,
and the terms of discourse shifted to another domain entirely. Junior Davis and
the two higher courts, each of which disagreed with the trial court's analysis,
employed each of these strategies at one time or another.
Junior Davis offered an alternative description of the seven cryopreserved
embryos. "As just two or eight cell tiny lumps of complex protein," he argued,
"the embryos have no real value to either party."' 76 Moreover, he offered
competing theories for interpreting the social significance of embryonic
development. Junior differentiated a fetus from an embryo and stressed that
the early embryo lacks a nervous system. Quoting the work of Professor John
Robertson, one of Junior's experts at trial, Junior declared:
Even if one takes a very cautious position on when a nervous
system begins, the earliest possible time of arguable relevance
is the formation of the primitive streak, the precursor to the
nervous system. Yet this first structure of the embryo proper
does not develop until implantation has occurred, some ten to
fourteen days after fertilization. "7
In a similar vein, the state court of appeals, with almost no elaboration,
simply replaced the trial court's interpretation of the relevant biological facts
with its own:
There are significant scientific distinctions between fertilized
ova that have not been implanted and an embryo in the
mother's womb. The fertilized ova at issue are between 4 and
8 cells. Genetically each cell is identical. . . . It is important
to remember when these ova were fertilized through mechanical
manipulation, their development was limited to the 8 cell
stage. 178
The Tennessee Supreme Court expressly dismissed Dr. Lejeune's scientific
testimony. While acknowledging Lejeune as "an internationally recognized
175. Id. at *24-25.
176. Davis Appellee Brief, supra note 143, at 18.
177. Id. at 7 (citing John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal
Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939, 974 (1986)).
178. Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *2 (footnote omitted).
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geneticist," the court noted that his "background fails to reflect any degree of
expertise in obstetrics or gynecology (specifically in the field of infertility) or
in medical ethics."179 Moreover, "his testimony revealed a profound
confusion between science and religion." i80 The court described in detail
the testimonies of Dr. Ray King and other experts, all of which controverted
Dr. Lejeune's testimony about the stages through which a fertilized ovum
proceeds during gestation."' 1 At the heart of this alternative depiction of
embryonic development is the "biologic difference between a preembryo and
an embryo."'2 Finally, the court concluded its description of the embryo's
development with its own disclaimer about the relevance of the distinction it
had just described between the preembryo and the embryo. "Admittedly, this
distinction," the court acknowledged, "is not dispositive in the case before
us. "1
83
3. The "Facts of Family"
The biological facts can be debated and revised. However, there are
alternative responses to a disconcerting characterization of the biological facts
for one party as presented by another party or a court. For instance, when
faced with an unsettling presentation of the biological facts, it is possible to
shift the level of discourse so that the biological facts become background to
a discussion about social, cultural, psychological or theological matters. Junior
Davis did precisely this. In arguing his case to the courts, he largely bypassed
the biological facts of embryonic development and presented his case in social,
rather than biological, terms. Unsurprisingly, in almost all of his arguments
before the courts, Junior Davis focused upon family and highlighted his desire
to preserve a traditional view of familial relationships.
Junior Davis referred to his genetic connection to the embryos in order to
support his constitutional right not to become a father. In this manner, he
defined the controversy as essentially unrelated to the facts of embryonic
development. For instance, in concluding his brief to the Tennessee Supreme
Court, he expressly stated that the dispute was not about embryos, but about
"whether or not the parties will become parents. ""' 4 This shift in focus made
relevant a variety of social and legal arguments and analogies that would have
been irrelevant had the case been about the existential status of the embryos,
179. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593 (Tenn. 1992)
180. Id.
181. Id. at 593-94.
182. Id. at 594. Dr. King's testimony, as summarized by the court, characterized the pre-embryonic
stage as continuing until cellular differentiation begins, about fourteen days after fertilization. Id.
183. Id.
184. Davis Appellee Brief, supra note 143, at 18.
[Vol. 7: 37
Reproductive Transformations
demonstrable only through reference to the biological facts of embryonic
development. If, as Junior argued, the central question in the case involved
the definition and regulation of family, then Junior did not need to focus
exclusively on disputing the trial court's understanding of the biological facts
of embryonic development. Instead, he could turn-as he did-to a variety of
laws and legal interpretations about the family that did not require any
consideration of the facts of embryonic development, or any further
consideration of the biological underpinnings traditionally thought to limit and
define family relations. He could, for example, rely on numerous constitutional
decisions rendered in the last three decades that define a right to family privacy
or autonomy. Those cases protect the right of individuals to establish familial
and other intimate relationships without state interference." 5 Junior's
definition of the case similarly allowed him to invoke various statutory rules
and regulations whose implications for the social and moral dimensions of
family relationships favored his case.
If, after all, the essential issue in Davis was not whether the embryos were
human, but the constitutional and statutory rights of the gamete donors (the
potential parents), then evidence about the specifics of embryonic development
was peripheral. Accordingly, Junior argued:
Tennessee specifically recognizes the high importance of family
or genetic relationships in conferring rights and benefits and
allocating burdens among citizens. In many areas of the law,
the mere fact of biological kinship alone is sufficient to confer
a right or impose a duty. In such areas the State acknowledges
the most ancient and fundamental rights and duties springing
from human kinship and will not intrude, even if more modern
concepts of fairness or equity might dictate otherwise. 186
At this point, Junior was able to invoke a series of statutes regulating the
relations between family members, such as those controlling intestate
inheritance, those imposing an obligation on a biological parent'1 7 to support
his or her child, and those regulating the donation of a deceased person's body
organs by family members."88 In relying on these statutory rules, Junior
suggested first, that whatever the existential status of the embryos, he could
be obliged to support any child produced from them, and second, that such a
development should not occur without his consent.
185. These cases include, among many others, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(invalidating a state birth control law on the basis of constitutional right to marital privacy); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (relying on constitutionally protected privacy right to invalidate state statute
prohibiting distribution of birth control to unmarried adults); and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(granting women limited right to abort pregnancies on the basis of constitutional privacy right).
186. Davis Appellee Brief, supra note 143, at 9.
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. at 9-11.
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For example, Junior analogized rules regulating the donation of body
organs to the regulation of the fate of the Davis embryos. Under Tennessee
law, the organs of a deceased person, absent a statement left by the deceased,
may be donated if the decedent's next of kin agree. If more than one person
is next-of-kin to the decedent (e.g., children or siblings), agreement must be
unanimous among all members of the group before donation can occur. Junior
suggested that similarly, in the case of frozen embryos, a decision to donate
(though apparently not to discard) the embryos should be affected only upon
agreement of both gamete donors. 89 Somewhat more implicitly, Junior used
the organ donation statute to invoke the importance of family and to connect
himself, and his position, to the notion of family. Tennessee rules regulating
organ donation by a dead person, he asserted, illustrated "the high degree of
respect and deference due human kinship."190 In this way, Junior transformed
the debate from one about the humanity of the embryos into one about the
parameters of family. As a result, he was able to associate his position with
the "ancient wellspring of kinship."191 Ironically, Junior's invocation of
family, and of the "ancient wellspring of kinship," aimed to protect his right
to remain free of family. He alluded to family and tradition in order to
safeguard his right to autonomous choice.' 92
The Tennessee Supreme Court, after considering and evaluating the
extensive testimony about biological facts and the consequent status of the
embryos, similarly shifted the level of discourse. First, the court switched from
the biological to the legal dimensions of the case, in order to draw conclusions
about the status of the embryos. Later, the court turned away entirely from
the question of the embryos' status or rights, and considered instead the
competing constitutional rights of the two gamete donors.
After considering the "scientific testimony" presented to the trial court
about the facts of embryonic development and concluding that the testimony
failed to compel any particular judicial response, 93 the court turned to an
examination of the state's treatment of fetuses in the womb.'94 Reviewing
the United States Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade,'95 which asserts
that fetuses are not "persons" under the law, the court concluded that the
embryos in Davis should certainly not be treated as legal persons. The court
189. Id. at 11, citing T.C.A. 68-30-101 (Tennessee's Anatomical Gift Act) and stating: "Each party's
interest in the disposition of the embryos springs from the same ancient wellspring of kinship involved in
the policy of organ donation set out above. No disposition should be made of their embryos unless they
both agree."
The Tennessee Court of Appeals also cited, and relied on, the state's Anatomical Gift Act in its
decision. 1990 Tenn. App. LEXIS 642, at *9, n.8.
190. Davis Appellee Brief, supra note 143, at 10.
191. Id. at 11.
192. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 1554-56 (analyzing replacement in constitutional jurisprudence of
concern for preservation of family with concern for protection of individual involved in intimate
relationships).
193. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 593-94 (Tenn. 1992).
194. Id. at 594.
195. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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still had to decide, however, what to do with the Davises' embryos. The legal
conclusion that embryos are not persons offered little more assistance than had
the parties' and experts' interpretations of the biological facts.
In order to reach and justify a concrete decision, the court shifted the focus
of its analysis even further from the existential status of the embryos. After
deciding that the embryos were neither persons (on the basis of some
combination of the biological facts and the law) nor property (on the apparent
basis of the court's own sense of things-including perhaps the very fact that
the embryos' biology could be, and had been, extensively considered), the
court focused on the rights of the gamete donors rather than on the rights of
(or "respect" owed) the embryos. In this regard, the court relied on Junior
Davis' view that the case was not about the embryos or where to store the
embryos, but rather "whether the parties will become parents."196
After reviewing federal and state assurances of a "right to privacy," the
court declared:
Obviously, the drafters of the Tennessee Constitution of 1796
could not have anticipated the need to construe the liberty
clauses of that document in terms of the choices flowing from
in vitro fertilization procedures. But there can be little doubt
that they foresaw the need to protect individuals from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters such as the
one now before us, involving intimate questions of personal and
family concern. 197
The court then addressed two equal rights deriving from the "right to
procreational autonomy" that it identified as being at stake in Davis-the "right
to procreate" and the "right to avoid procreation" 19'-and undertook to
weigh "the relative interests" of Junior and Mary Sue in regard to the
embryos. 1 99
Thus, the court all but abandoned its concern with the existential status of
the embryos. The court's holding effectively disregarded its own determination
that the existential status of the embryos demanded they be given "special
respect" because of their potential for life2' and instead favored the status
and rights of the gamete donors. By asserting that the case was essentially
about the contours of the family, albeit a disintegrating family, the court
apparently satisfied its condition that the law respect the embryos, and
therefore felt free to focus on the interests of the gamete donors. In effect, the
decision presumes that the gamete donors, as family or potential family to the
196. 842 S.W.2d at 598.
197. Id. at 600.
198. Id. at 601.
199. Id. at 603-04.
200. Id. at 596-97.
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embryos, would demonstrate the requisite respect for the embryos in any
decision about the embryos' use or disposition.
Essentially, the court was able to rely on the possibility of separating
biological from social fact. As Marilyn Strathern has asserted:
Arguments in favour of embracing the new reproductive
technologies can point to them as techniques that will alleviate
suffering and provide remedies for disability, and thus enable
the family to take its proper and traditional form. The domains
of biological and social fact are not, in this view, to be
confused. Medical intervention is strictly intervention in the
biological process. And while it may alter the disposition of
kin, that is, alter expectations about who becomes related, the
traditional family as a social unit is not necessarily
challenged. 01
The possibility of separating the biological and social facts of family allows
parties and courts to premise their arguments on the significance of preserving
traditional families even in cases in which the biological facts are unknown,
ambiguous-as in Davis-or in apparent conflict with the view, pervasive in
Western cultures, that specific biological relationships anchor family
relationships. The Supreme Court in Davis, unlike the trial court, was unable
or unwilling to ground its decision on the certainty of inexorable natural fact.
Instead the court shifted the level of discourse and focused on a domain of
social interaction, that of the family. That domain has long held a special, even
sacred, place in Western culture and has been understood through reference
to biological facts that have more generally been assumed than delineated and
described. Thus, again, the respect the court declared that the law owed the
embryos on the basis of their existential status was satisfied by according
respect to the two people who might have become the embryos' parents.
In fact, the court's opinion allowed for, and even encouraged, explicit
contractual regulation of cryopreserved embryos in future cases. In the absence
of any agreements between the Davises, the court ultimately effected a
disposition that relied, more than anything, on its own sense of the harm Junior
would suffer by having children produced from the embryos, as compared to
the relative benefit to Mary Sue if the embryos were to survive to become
children.
In the end, the court was able to "respect" and to avert the biological
reality of embryonic development and of four-cell cryopreserved embryos. It
was able to connect the extensive testimony provided by experts at trial to its
characterization of the embryos as deserving of "respect." The court
accomplished this without considering the concrete implications of respecting
201. STRATHERN, supra note 19, at 6.
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embryos and without directly actualizing the presumption of respect at all.
Moreover, the court was able to preserve traditional views of the family by
premising its decision on the parties' familial status, while simultaneously
defying tradition almost entirely by suggesting that contract law, rather than
family law, could best deal with cryopreserved embryos.
Thus, the opinion of the supreme court ultimately can be read both to
connect biological truth to the social order and to disassociate the two almost
completely. Further, the opinion can be read to herald, or at least to
encourage, a radically new view of intimate (family) relationships, and yet to
focus chiefly on safeguarding old-fashioned rights and responsibilities
connected to the family. It can be read in these often contradictory ways in
large part because the court appeared to ground its decision in a reasoned
assessment of what Judge Daughtrey, writing for the state supreme court in
Davis, called the "scientific testimony" (the biological facts), while
acknowledging quite forthrightly that those facts failed to direct the court to
a clear holding in the case. In a sense, the biological facts offered solace where
they failed to offer guidance. They allowed the court to invoke tradition and
the sacred order of old-fashioned families, while permitting it to suggest that,
to resolve disputes such as those in Davis, contract law might be better than
family law.
In short, the Davis case, taken as a whole, shows the continuing interest
of the law and of society in predicating family relationships on biological
truths, as well as some of the options available when those truths are difficult
to decipher or do not provide clear direction for resolving controversies
occasioned by reproductive technology. Even if the assumed connections
between family relationships and biological facts can be rent asunder by
reproductive technology, or already have been to whatever degree, it remains
possible to invoke tradition as if it has remained intact.
CONCLUSION
Over the last 150 years, the American family has changed dramatically.
Only within the past three decades, however, has that change been recognized
expressly by society and reflected in the law.2"2 Increasingly since the
1960's, legislators and courts have recognized families as collections of
autonomous individuals, rather than as holistic social units composed of
relationships grounded in notions of inexorable, biological truth.
202. See Dolgin, supra note 11, at 1559-70 (analyzing changes in American family and response of
law to those changes).
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Even at mid-century, family law almost uniformly reflected an ideology
of family predicated on unchallenged assumptions about the force and meaning
of biological connections. Exceptions were rare and, where possible, were
assimilated to the model of the traditional, holistic family, defined through
biological bonds.2 3 Then, with startling rapidity, views of family-including
those that informed legislative and judicial responses-changed basically and
dramatically in the second half of the twentieth century.
This change has been accelerated by the explosive development of
reproductive technology. This technology poses a significant threat to old-
fashioned notions of family, which in turn reflects a more pervasive set of
challenges to the traditional family and starkly illustrates the character and
depth of the changes now affecting it. By disrupting central and rarely
examined assumptions about the biological correlates of family, reproductive
technology endangers the ideological framework within which family has long
been understood. In consequence, reproductive technology and the family it
produces may encourage the ideological transformation of the American
family. At the very least, it compels re-examination of the assumptions
undergirding the meaning of family.
At present, reproductive technology confronts a legal system still committed
in significant part to old-fashioned conceptions of family with families that
often cannot be assimilated into those conceptions. As a consequence of
reproductive technology, the implications for society of the biological facts of
reproduction cannot be taken for granted, and such facts no longer allow
family to be defined and regulated in a straightforward fashion. In cases
occasioned by reproductive technology, biological truths may be invoked to
identify a child's "real" parents, but opposing parties often present the same
biological facts to demonstrate contrary conclusions. Sometimes, the
recognition that biological facts no longer securely anchor the society's
understanding of family and family relations presents a new challenge to the
biological facts themselves. Sometimes, the biological facts may be elided by
an appeal to tradition that focuses on the social facts of family. And sometimes
a new view of family emerges clearly, a view that values autonomy more than
connection, and therefore suggests that family relationships are grounded not
in natural law, but in individual choice.
Disputes occasioned by reproductive technology force courts to
reconsider-and, thus, often to reinvent-assumptions that undergird notions
of mother, father, child, and family. Courts have been attracted to definitions
of family that acknowledge choice and individuality, but also to traditional
conceptions of family in which relations are anchored in certain truth. As a
result, courts have attempted to preserve familiar understandings of family
203. Adoption, for instance, was unavailable under the common law and was not given legal status
in the United States until the mid-nineteenth century. Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of
the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 443 (1971).
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while also including within the definition of family forms of relationship
familiar not to the home but to the market.
In this attempt, courts have resorted to mechanisms, but thus far, perforce,
without success. Thus, for instance, in Johnson and in McDonald state courts
distinguished between two biological mothers in determining a child's legal
mother by relying on parental intent.2' On the one hand, the notion of intent
is reflective of a universe of choice and negotiated realities-of the
marketplace; but the courts in these cases also made intent seem substitutable
for blood or genes in traditional understandings of family. Each court
presumed to define the family at issue in terms that appeared to encompass the
world of the market and the world of the traditional home.
But the use of intent as mediator has not resolved, perhaps because it
cannot resolve, the differences between two very different worlds. Intent is
linked essentially to a world of autonomous individuality and choice, not to
a world of fixed relations predicated on biological truth. Moreover, intent
cannot accomplish the task assigned it because intentions shift and are always
complex.
Other courts have employed other mechanisms to mediate the conflicts
which reproductive technology forces upon the traditional family.205 But none
of these mechanisms has provided a satisfactory framework for imagining (or
regulating) the changing family. Indeed, judicial reliance on notions such as
intent depends on, and elaborates, existing confusions. Were the law to allow
families-and the parent-child connection, in particular-to be unequivocally
defined through contractual negotiations, the ambiguities would be resolved.
However, no court has allowed that.2"6
The law may move more fully to rely on notions of contract in
determining the scope and meaning of family. It may oppose the erosion of
the distinction between home and market by regulating strictly, or prohibiting
absolutely, the creation of families through reproductive technology. Or some
intermediary, or entirely novel, option may emerge. Whatever happens, the
disputes currently occasioned by reproductive technology, and those certain
to appear, reflect an ongoing debate between ancient and contemporary
conceptions of the family in particular and, in general, between radically
204. Judicial reliance on the notion of "intent" in defining families produced through reproductive
technology is analyzed in depth in Dolgin, supra note 37.
205. For instance, several courts have relied on the traditional notion of the "best interests" of the
child to select parents in cases occasioned by reproductive technology. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting); In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988). That notion,
however, must itself be predicated on some notion of family and thus provides only the illusion of escaping
from the contradictions between families defined through the terms of the marketplace and families defined
through the inevitabilities of blood or genes.
206. Even the trial court in Baby M, In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988), which seemed to rely on a surrogacy
contract in terminating the parental rights of a surrogate mother, disclaimed such reliance in stating at the
very start of its opinion that all matters discussed in the opinion beyond the best interests of Baby M,
herself, were mere "commentary." Id. at 1132.
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different, and perhaps irreconcilable, conceptions of society-a debate that,
for obvious reasons must be closely and very carefully watched.
